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THE CREDIT SELLER'S RECLAMATION RIGHT UNDER
SUBSECTION 2-702(2) OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE; ITS STATUS WHEN THE INTERESTS OF THIRD
PARTIES INTERVENE

I. INTRODUCTION
Generally, subsection 2-702(2) of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC)' gives a credit seller the right to reclaim goods
delivered to an insolvent buyer.2 However, while section 2-702
In preparing this note, the author relied primarily on the following authorities: 3A R.
DUESENBERG & L. KING, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
(1986); G. WALLACH, THE LAW OF SALES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE(1981); Mann &

Phillips, The Reclaiming Seller Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act: Resolution or Renewal of an Old Conflict?, 33
VAND. L. REV. 1 (1980); Mann & Phillips, Section 545(c) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act: An Imperfect
Resolution of the Conflict Between the Reclaiming Seller and the Bankruptcy Trustee, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 239
(1980); Wallach, The Unpaid Seller's Right to Reclaim Goods: The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code
and the Bankruptcy Acts of 1898 and 1978, 34 ARK. L. REV. 252 (1980); Comment, Section 545(c) of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act: A Seller's "Exclusive" Reclamation Remedy?, 3 J.L. COM. 389 (1983). For
additional information, see: Anderson, The Reclaiming Seller Under UCC Section 2-702 vs. His Four
Horsemen of the Apocalypse, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 271 (1976); Kennedy, The Interest of a Reclaiming Seller
Under Article 2 ofhe Code, 30 Bus. LAW 833 (1975); Roper, The Reclaiming Seller's Rights to Goods and
Proceeds a3 Against Third Parties, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 547 (1985); Siegal, Reclamationfrom an Insolvent Vendee
-Mission
Impossible?, 9 U.C.C. L.J. 27 (1976).
1. U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (1978). Subsection 2 of § 2-702 provides as follow,:
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while
insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after the
receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller in
writing within three months before delivery the ten day limitation does not apply.
Except as provided in this subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim goods
on the buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to
pay.
Id.
2. See id. § 2-702(2) (1978). Although the focus of this Article is solely on the rights of the
reclaiming credit seller proceeding under § 2-702(2), a cash seller also has a reclamation right under
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provides a right of recovery against an insolvent buyer, it does not
expressly state the status of the seller's right to reclaim when the
goods become subject to a third party's claim or interest. 3 Because
section 2-702 does not provide for third party claims, resolving the
challenge of a third party claimant is an arduous task, resulting in a
4
strained and diverse body of case law.
Third party claims commonly arise in the following instances:
(1) when a subsequent purchaser buys the goods from the insolvent
buyer; (2) when a secured creditor of the buyer has an interest in
the goods as collateral; (3) when a creditor obtains a lien on the
insolvent buyer's property; or (4) when the trustee of a bankrupt
buyer seeks to avoid the reclamation claim.5
This note addresses the status of the reclamation right as it
existed under pre-Code common law, and the present character of
the right as it exists under the provisions of the UCC 6 and the 1978
Bankruptcy Code.7 The aim of this note is to point out the
inconsistencies and inequities resulting from omissions in section 22-507(2). See, e.g., Holiday Rambler Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank &Trust Co., 723 F.2d 1449, 145153 (10th Cir. 1983) (recognizing cash seller's right to reclaim goods); In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287
F.Supp. 840, 846 (W.D. Va. 1968) (seller paid by a check later dishonored is entitled to reclamation
under §§ 2-507 and 2-511).
3. See U.C.C. § 2-702 (1978). Subsection 2-702(3) provides that the reclamation right "is
subject to the rights of a buyer in the ordinary course of other good faith purchaser." Id. S 2-702(3).
This provision is couched in terms of the "rights" of third parties but the Code fails to state what
these rights are. Id. For the text of S 2-702(3), see infra note 32.
4. See generally 67A AM. JUR. 2D Sales §§ 1032-50 (2d ed. 1985) (broadly discussing the status of
the § 2-702 reclamation right); Annot., 17 A.L.R. 3D 1010 (1968 & Supp. 1985) (discussing major
cases involving § 2-702).
5. See, e.g., 1 R. ALDERMAN, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
1.81-20 (2d ed. 1983) (parties who may claim an interest in the goods include good faith purchasers
from the buyer, lien creditors, secured creditors, and a trustee in bankruptcy); G: WALLACH, THE
LAW OF SALES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
7.04 (1981) (discussing the unpaid seller's
right of reclamation relevant to subsequent buyers of the goods, secured parties, other creditors of
the buyer, and the buyer's trustee in bankruptcy). See generally 3A R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, SALES
& BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 13.03[41[dl (1986) (discussing the
status of the § 2-702 reclamation right when contested by subsequent purchasers, lien creditors and
bankruptcy trustees); 67A AM. JuR. 2D Sales §§ 1044-47 (2d ed. 1985) (a broad overview of the
reclamation right when contested by subsequent purchasers, secured creditors, and lien creditors).
6. See generally 67A AM. JUR. 2D Sales § 1026 (2d ed. 1985) (listing local statutory citations and
variations of UCC § 2-702). Among the states that have adopted § 2-702, the only significant
variation in the provision is the omission of "or lien creditor" from subsection 3. See infra notes 11213. The only other variation is in the North Dakota version, which adds a subsection that is not
contained in the official 5 2-702. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-02-81(4) (1983). This additional
subsection provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a producer of agricultural
products, upon discovery of the buyer's insolvency, may reclaim the products within
ten days after the receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the
producer in writing within three months before delivery, the ten-day limitation does
not apply. The producer's right to reclaim is not subject to the rights of a buyer in the
ordinary course of business or other good faith purchaser.
Id.
7. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
SS101-151326) (1983). For a discussion of the conflict between a reclaiming seller and a bankruptcy
trustee, see infra notes 176-224 and accompanying text.
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702, and to suggest methods or means that may be used to remedy
these problems.
II. RECLAMATION IN GENERAL
A. AT

COMMON LAW

At common law, the right of an unpaid seller to reclaim goods
generally depended upon whether the transaction was a sale for
cash or an extension of credit.8 In a cash sale 9 the seller retained full
title and ownership of the goods while the buyer received only a
void title until payment was made.1 0 If payment was not made, the
seller could regain possession from the buyer through an action in
replevin." Furthermore, because the nonpaying cash buyer
received only void title, any transfer of the goods to a third party
was not accompanied by the title, and the third party was also
12
subject to a reclamation action by the seller.
The general rule in credit sales13 was that full ownership and
valid title passed to the buyer when the contract was executed. 14 In
the event the credit buyer did not make payment, the seller's only
remedy was an action for the purchase price. 15 The unpaid seller's
status was merely that of a general creditor, with no right to regain
8. See Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 510 F.2d 139, 144-45 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd on
other grounds, 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976). In a cash sale, one goal of the
seller was to avoid the risk of nonpayment. See id. at 144. In a credit sale, however, the common law
presumed that the seller assumed at least some risk of nonpayment. Id. at 145. Therefore, the
common law did not protect the credit seller to the same extent that it protected the unpaid cash
seller. See id.; see also, G. WALLACH, supra note 5, 7.03 (discussing the common-law right to reclaim
in both the cash sale and credit sale context).
9. At common law, in a cash sale the property interests in the goods did not transfer until the
buyer paid the purchase price. L. VOLD, HANDBOOK OF THlE LAW OF SALES §§ 62-66 (1931). In an
ordinary sale, however, title passed to the buyer when the parties agreed to the terms of the sale,
regardless of whether payment was made. Id. If there was doubt concerning whether the parties
intended an ordinary sale or a cash sale, the transaction was presumed an ordinary sale with the title
passing at the time of agreement. Id.; see also G. WALLACH, supra note 5, 7.03 (describing a typical
cash sale as a contemporaneous exchange of goods for cash or check).
10. Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 510 F.2d 139, 144 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other
grounds, 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976); G. WALLACH, supra note 5, 1 7.03.
11. Samuels, 510 F.2d at 144. Replevin generally allows a person with a right to possession to
recover specific property from one who has either wrongfully taken or detained the goods. See R.
HILLMAN, 1. McDONNELL & S. NICKLES, COMMON LAW AND EQUITY UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERICAL CODE
9.02171[bi (1985), The buyer's action in replevin is also authorized under the
UCC See U.C.C. § 2-716(3) (1978).
12. G. WALLACH, supra note 5, 7.04111. The seller in a cash sale could even reclaim goods sold
by the original buyer to a person who otherwise qualified as a bona fide purchaser. Id. This result
was not universally accepted, however, and a minority trend later developed favoring the third party
purchaser in transactions involving negotiable paper. F. BURDICK, THE LAW OF SALES OF PERSONAL
PROPERTY
284-86 (3d ed. 1913). The purpose of giving the third party purchaser a superior right
was to promote the transferability of goods and to foster commerce. Id.
13. The credit sale generally involves the use of a credit instrument such as a note or a postdated
check. G. WALLACH, supra note 5, 7.03.
14. F. BURDICK, supra note 12,
2. The credit seller could retain title if the sale was conditional
and contained an express provision stating that the seller retained title. See id.
15. See Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels &Co.), 510 F.2d 139, 144 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'don other
grounds, 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976). The credit seller was given less
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possession of the goods. 16 However, the minimal status of the credit
seller was subject to an exception if the sale had been induced by
the misrepresentation or fraud of the buyer.1 7 If the buyer entered
the transaction with no intention of making payment, or made
substantial misstatements about his financial condition, the sale
was considered fraudulent and the buyer received only voidable
title. 1 8 The seller could rescind the fraudulent sale and thereby
regain title and possession of the goods. 19 Additionally, rescission
for fraud was, with the exception of a bona fide purchaser,2 0 valid
2
against any third party who acquired the goods from the buyer. '
B.

ELEMENTS

OF

RECLAMATION

UNDER

THE

UNIFORM

COMMERICAL CODE

The Uniform Commercial Code significantly changed the
22
credit seller's common-law right to reclaim delivered goods.1
Under UCC subsection 2-702(2), a seller must meet three
requirements to have a valid reclamation claim: (1) the transaction
protection than the cash seller pursuant to the reasoning that the creditor, by selling on credit,
voluntarily assumed the risk of nonpayment. Id. at 145. The cash seller, on the other hand, had
assumed virtually no risk of nonpayment, expecting to receive full payment upon delivery. Id.; see
also G. WALLACH, supra note 5, 7.03 (discussing the rationale for the common-law distinction).
16. Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 510 F.2d 139, 144 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other
grounds, 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976). The right to have the goods
returned through an action in replevin was not available to the credit seller because the buyer was not
considered to have wrongfully obtained possession of the goods. See G. WALLACH, supra note 5,
7.03. A wrongful taking or detention of property is required for a replevin action. See supra note 11.
17. See 3A R. DUESENBERO & L. KING, supra note 5, § 13.03[41[al (at common law seller could
reclaim goods if purchase was fraudulent); G. WALLACH, supra note 5,
7.03 (seller could reclaim
goods if he proved buyer acted fraudulently); Wallach, The Unpaid Seller's Right to Reclaim Goods: The
Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Acts of,1898 and 1978, 34 ARK. L. REv. 252, 253
(1980) (buyer who purchases goods while insolvent, knowing that he is unable to pay for them, acts
fraudulently thus entitling the seller to reclaim) [hereinafter Wallach, Right to Reclaim].
When the buyer fraudulently obtained possession of the goods, an action in replevin was available to
the defrauded seller, thus entitling him to repossession. See supra notes 11, 16.
18. See 3A R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, supra note 5, § 13.03[41[al. The actual amount of fraud
that had to be proved by the reclaiming seller varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Id. In some
jurisdictions, it was necessary to show an actual fraudulent misrepresentation. Id. In others, it was
enough to show any misrepresentation. Id. In still others, an intention not to pay was imputed
merely upon a showing that the buyer knew he could not make payment. Id.; see also F. BURDICK,
supra note 12,
298- 99 (defining fraudulent misrepresentation).
19. L. VOLD, supra note 9, at 374. Under principles of equity, full title to the goods was viewed
as never having passed and the parties were restored to their precontract position. See id.; see also 3A
R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, supra note 5, § 13.03[4][a] (seller could rescind purchase made pursuant
to buyer's fraudulent misrepresentations, and thereby regain title).
20. See F. BURDICK, supra note 12, 1 291 (to have valid title subsequent purchaser must take in
good faith and give value). Lack of knowledge of outstanding claims was necessary to the commonlaw bona fide purchaser. See id. The Code's "good faith purchaser" provisions have no such
requirement. See U.C.C. § 1-201 (33) (1978) (defining purchaser); id. § 2-103 (1)(b) (defining good
faith); see also G. WALLACH, supra note 5, 7.04[2], at n.39 (unlike common law, Code does not
require purchaser to be unaware of adverse claims in order to quality as a bona tide purchaser).
21. F. BURICK, supra note 12, 289-91. A minority view, however, permitted a lien creditor to
succeed over the seller. G. WALLACH, supra note 5
7.04[31. This approach was based on the theory
that the lien creditor qualified as a good faith purchaser if he advanced funds to the buyer after the
receipt of the goods. See id. Additionally, the result was justified by reference to the lien holder's right
to rely on the buyer's possession of the goods as evidence of ownership. Id.
22. See U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (1978). The most significant changes from the common law are that
reclamation is possible without fraud on the part of the buyer, and that insolvency of the buyer is
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must have been conducted on credit terms; 23 (2) the seller must
25
"discover'' 2 4 that the buyer has received goods while insolvent;
and (3) the seller must demand return of the goods within ten days
of their receipt by the buyer unless the buyer made a written
misrepresentation of solvency within three months prior to the
delivery of the goods. 26 If the seller received a written
misrepresentation of solvency2 7 within three months before the
delivery of the goods, the ten day limitation for demand does not
apply. 28 Furthermore, although not mentioned in either the text or
comments of section 2-702, most courts require that the seller rely
upon the misrepresentation of solvency before granting the remedy
always required. See id. official comment no. 2. Under the Uniform Sales Act, the predecessor to the
UCC, there was usually no reclamation remedy for a defrauded credit seller. See U.S.A. §§ 54, 61
(discussing the unpaid seller's rights against an insolvent purchaser), reprinted in I. MARIASH, LAW
OF SALES, at 774, 777 (1930). Under the Uniform Sales Act a credit seller had a lien on goods still in
his possession but the lien was lost when he gave up possession. Id. § 56.
23. U.C.C. S 2-702(2) (1978). In characterizing a sale as either cash or credit courts generally
consider the intent of the parties. See In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F.Supp. 840, 844 (W.D. Va.
1968). Other factors may also be considered, such as industry custom or prior dealing between the
parties. See In re Perpall, 256 F. 758, 759-60 (2d Cir. 1919). To constitute a cash sale, the exchange of
the goods and the sales price must occur "substantially simultaneously." See Engstrom v. Wiley, 191
F.2d 684, 686 (9th Cir. 1951) (in a cash sale delivery and payment are concurrent but need not be
exactly simultaneous). However, ifa seller allows a transaction to proceed after a buyer fails to make
payment on demand, the transaction is classified as a credit sale, even if the intent of the parties and
contract terms classify the transaction as a cash sale. See Bar Control v. Gifford (In re Colacci's of
America, Inc.), 490 F.2d 1118, 1121 (10th Cir. 1974). See generally, 67A AM. Jut. 2D Sales § 1036 (2d
ed. 1985) (discussing § 2-702(2) requirement that sale be on credit); U.C.C. Rep. Serv. Dig.
(Callaghan) 5 2702.2 (3) (citing cases construing the phrase "sale on credit") (1985).
24. U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (1978). The "discovery" requirement usually means that reclamation
will be denied if the seller knew of the buyer's insolvency before the goods were delivered. See In re
Haugabook Auto Co., 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1095, 1096 (M.D. Ga. 1971) ("[a] seller
who knows of the buyer's insolvency or knows that the buyer misrepresented his solvency, and who
nevertheless engages in credit transactions with the buyer, is in no position to complain") (footnote
omitted); 3 W. HAWKi-AND, U.C.C. SERIES § 2-702:05. ('[ilf . . the seller knew that the buyer was
insolvent before delivery was made and made the delivery anyway, no action may be maintained").
But seeMonsanto Co. v. Walter E. Heller &Co., 114 11. App. 3d 1078, __,
449 N. E.2d 993, 998999 (1983) (a demand made within ten days after delivery was effective despite the seller's knowledge
of the buyer's insolvency prior to delivery).
25. U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (1978). Subsection 23 of 51-201 provides: "A person is 'insolvent' who
either has ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary course of business or cannot pay his debts as they
become due or is insolvent within the meaning of the federal bankruptcy law." Id. § 1-201(23,)
(1978). Insolvency under federal bankruptcy law is defined as liabilities in excess of assets "at a fair
valuation." See 11 U.S.C. § 101(26)(A) (1982).
26. U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (1978). The exact method of computing the ten day period has been a
critical issue under similar provisions. See, e.g., Montello Oil Corp. v. Marin Motor Oil, Inc. (In re
Matin Motor Oil, Inc.), 740 F.2d 220, 226-28 (3d Cir. 1984) (under 5 546(c) ofthe bankruptcy laws,
a demand sent by the telex at 11:04 p.m. on the tenth day, but not "received" until buyer turned on
its telex machine the following morning, was timely); Szabo v. Vinton Motors, Inc., 630 F.2d 1, 3-4
(1st Cir. 1980) (interpreting § 2-702(2) and concluding that the ten day period runs from the date the
buyer receives the goods, not from the date the seller receives notice of check's dishonor); Action
Indus., Inc. v. Dixie Enter. (In re Dixie Enter.), 22 Bankr. 855, 858, (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (under
§ 546(c) of the bankruptcy laws, if the tenth day falls on a Sunday, the period for reclamation
extends another clay).
27. U.C.C. § 2-702 (1978). In order to constitute a sufficient misrepresentation of solvency,
"the statement of solvency must be in writing, addressed to the particular seller and dated within
three months of delivery." Id. official comment no. 2. But see Bel Air Carpets, Inc. v. Mand Carpet
Mills (In re Bel Air Carpets, Inc.), 452 F.2d 1210, 1212 (9th Cir. 1971) (rejecting the requirement,
stated in official comment number two, that the misrepresentation must be dated within three
months of delivery), Seealso 67A Ara. JuR. 2D Sales § 1040 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing what constitutes a
written misrepresentation of solvency).
28. U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (1978).
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provided for in section 2-702.29
The right to reclaim is limited to the goods themselves, and
they must be identified as those delivered under the contract.3 0 If
the seller attempts to reclaim after the goods have been sold, he
generally has no right to the proceeds. 3 1 A successful reclamation
attempt also excludes all other remedies regarding the goods
involved. 32 Furthermore, even if the seller can establish all the
elements of a reclamation right, he may still lose the right to
repossess the goods. 33 The right may be denied on principles of
estoppel or waiver, 3 4 or may terminate upon tender of payment by
35
the buyer.
29. See, e.g.,
Shapiro v. Union Bank & Savings Co. (In re Hardin), 458 F.2d 938, 941-42 (7th
Cir. 1972) (a bank, which in no way relied upon the misrepresentations of the buyer, not allowed to
exercise the seller's right of reclamation); In re Haugabook Auto Co., 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1095, 1096 (M.D. Ga. 1971) (credit seller must prove reliance on misrepresentation of
solvency before reclamation may be effectuated under § 2-702); Theo. Hamm Brewing Co. v. First
Trust & Say. Bank, 103 I11.
App. 2d 190, 196, 242 N.E.2d 911, 915 (1968) (court noted that without
the reliance requirement a credit seller could utilize § 2-702 to obtain protection when his conduct
was inconsistent with the § 1-203 requirement of dealing in good faith).
30. See, e.g., Party Packing Corp. v. Rosenberg (In re Landy Beef Co.), 30 Bankr. 19, 21,
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1981) (unpaid seller could not reclaim goods (cut meat) since by the time demand
was made, the goods were either not identifiable or had been sold); In re Hayward Woolen Co., 3
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1107, 1112 (D. Mass. 1967) (seller's petition for reclamation denied
because he failed to trace any goods in the bankrupt's possession back to himself); see also 3
HAWKLAND U.C.C. SERIES 5 2-702:04 (maintaining that a reclamation claim involving fungible
goods should not be defeated on grounds that the goods are not identifiable).
31. See, e.g.,
Collingwood Grain v. Coast Trading Co. (In re Coast Trading Co.), 744 F.2d 686,
691-92 (9th Cir. 1984) (unpaid seller had no right, either under UCC §§ 2-507 or 2-702 or under §
546 of the Bankruptcy Code, to claim the proceeds from the resale of goods); Party Packing Corp. v.
Rosenberg (In re Landy Beef Co.), 30 Bankr. 19, 21, (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) (seller had no right to
proceeds of goods); B & P Lumber Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 147 Ga. App. 762, -,
250 S.E.
2d 505, 508 (1978) (unpaid seller cannot sue holder of a security interest in buyer's inventory who
had taken possession and sold the goods after learning of the buyer's insolvency).
Section 2-702 does not mention the extension of the right of reclamation to proceeds realized
from the sale of the goods. See U.C.C. § 2-702 (1978). Section 2-702 only mentions the right to
reclaim the goods themselves and many courts have declined to give the reclaiming seller any right to
proceeds. Id.;see, e.g.,
Collingwood, 744 F.2d at 691.
There have been occasions however, usually under equitable principles, when the reclaiming
seller has received a right to proceeds realized from the sale of the goods. See, e.g.,
United States v.
Westside Bank, 732 F.2d 1258, 1265 (5th Cir. 1984) (seller retained priority status to the extent of
traceable proceeds provided all prior secured interests in the goods had been fully satisfied); Greater
Louisville Auto Auction, Inc. v. Ogle Buick, Inc., 387 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Ky. 1965) (sellers ofcars may
claim the proceeds from an auction resale of the automobiles).
32. U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1978). Subsection 3 of § 2-702 provides: "The seller's right to reclaim
under subsection (2) is subject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith
purchaser under this Article (Section 2-403). Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other
remedies with respect to them. As amended 1966." Id.
33. See id. § 1-103 (1978). Section 1"103 provides: "Unless displaced by the particular
provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law
relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress,
coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its
provisions." Id. For examples of how these principles have precluded reclamation attempts, see infra
notes 34-35.
34. See, e.g., Action Indus., Inc. v. Dixie Enter. (In re Dixie Enter.), 22 Bankr. 855, 860 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1982) (under § 546(c) of the bankruptcy laws seller lost his right to reclaim when his
attempt to regain the goods did not come until more than six months after the reclamation demand);
In re Food Center of Delhi, Inc,, 353 F. Supp. 502, 503 (W.D. La. 1973) (seller lost his reclamation
right by selling on credit to a buyer he knew to be insolvent); In re Behring & Behring, 5 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 600, 606-07 (N.D. Tex. 1968) (reclamation right lost when seller did not follow up
on an oral demand until after buyer went bankrupt).
35. See Queensboro Farm Prod., Inc. v. Wetson's Corp. (In reWeston's Corp.), 17 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In Wetson's the court stated that although a literal
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Thus, the common-law right to reclaim based on a buyer's
misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to pay has been totally
displaced by subsection 2-702(2).36 Subsection 2-702(2) provides a
credit seller with a much broader reclamation right against an
insolvent buyer than did the common law. 37 The utility of
subsection 2-702(2) when a third party has a competing claim,
however, is neither as broad nor as clear.
III. THE RIGHT OF RECLAMATION VS. THIRD PARTY
CLAIMS
A.

RECLAIMING SELLER VS. SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER

Under subsection 2-702(3), when the goods subject to the
seller's reclamation right have been sold by the original insolvent
buyer, the seller generally has no right to their return.3 8 The result
is based upon the principle of fostering commerce. 39
Subsection 3 of section 2-702 provides that the right of
reclamation "is subject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course
or other good faith purchaser. "40 It then provides a cross reference
to section 2-403 for a determination of those rights. 4 1 Under section
reading of S 2-702 could give a seller the absolute right to reclaim, the good faith provisions of the
Code should terminate the right upon tender of payment. Id. at 426; see U.C.C. § 1-201(19)
(defining good faith). The court also stated that the reclamation right falls within the definition of a
lien, which ends on tender of payment. Wetson's Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 426.
36. gee Collingwood Grain, Inc. v. Coast Trading Co. (In re Coast Trading Co.), 744 F.2d 686,
690 (9th Cir. 1984) (grain company had no common-law right to reclaim shipments of grain because
§ 2-702 preempts the common law); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Eli Witt Co. (In re Eli Witt Co.),
12 Bankr. 757, 761 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) (common-law reclamation claim no longer exists under
the Code).
37. See U.C.C. § 2-702 (1978). Under § 2-702 the seller no longer needs to prove that the buyer
acted fraudulently because the section provides an irrebuttable presumption that any receipt of goods
on credit by an insolvent buyer amounts to a tacit business misrepresentation of solvency. See id.
official comment no. 2.
38. See U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1978). Under § 2- 702(3), a seller's right to reclaim goods in the
possession of an insolvent buyer is expressly made subject to the rights of a buyer in the ordinary
course of business or other good faith purchaser. Id.; see also English v. Ford, 17 Cal. App. 3d 1038,
1047, 95 Cal. Rptr. 501, 506 (1971) (seller's right to reclaim car subject to rights of buyers in
ordinary course or good faith purchasers). This is an exception to the general rule that a seller's
remedies are not affected by matters of title. Ramco Steel, Inc. v. Kesler(In re Murdock Mach. &
Eng'g Co.), 620 F.2d 767, 774 (10th Cir. 1980).
39. G. WALLACH, supra note 5,
7.04[11. The good faith purchaser is given extensive protection
so that merchants may engage in commercial transactions without having to investigate the seller's
property rights. See id. The extensive protection also allows a creditor to rely on the possession of
property when the property is offered for sale or to secure a loan. See id.
40. U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1978). The text of subsection 3 of S 2-702 is provided supra note 32.
Since the subsection conditions the reclamation right on the rights of third party purchasers, two
different interpretations are possible. See id.
One interpretation directly subordinates the 5 2-702 reclamation right to a good faith purchaser.
See, e.g., Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Wathens Elevators, Inc. (In re Wathens Elevators, Inc.), 32
Bankr. 912, 918 (W.D. Ky. 1983) (cot cluding that seller's right of reclamation was subject to good
faith purchaser's rights). The second iiterpretation subjects the reclamation claim to the "rights" of
a good faith purchaser, whatever they may be. See, e.g., Collingwood Grain, Inc. v. Coast Trading.
Co. (In re Coast Trading Co.), 744 F.2d 686, 690 (9th Cir. 1984) (good faith purchaser prevailed
through a determination of his rights under § 2-403).
41. U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1978).
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2-403, a purchaser of goods acquires all title his transferor had or
had power to transfer. 42 Section 2-403 further provides that a
person with mere voidable title can pass good title to a good faith
purchaser for value. 43 Under this analysis, although the original
buyer has voidable title, 44 the subsequent purchaser obtains valid
title and is entitled to keep the goods over the reclamation right of
45
the original seller.
This result, however, depends upon the subsequent purchaser
qualifying as a "buyer in ordinary course" 46 or "good faith
purchaser for value."47 Good faith is a common element of both
42. U.C.C. § 2-403 (1978). Section 2-403, in relevant part, provides:
(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to
transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent
of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title
to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a
transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale", or
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the
criminal law.
(2) Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind
gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of
business.
Id.
43. Id. § 2-403(1) (1978). This is a codification of the common-law rule. See supra notes 2021 and accompanying text.
44. Although neither §§ 2-702 nor 2-403 state that the insolvent buyer obtains voidable title, this
was the result under the common law and the courts have found it to also be the case under § 2-702.
See U.S. Billiards Co. v. Greenberger (In re Bensar Co.), 36 Bankr. 699, 702 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1984).
The concept of "voidable title" has been described as "a vague idea, never defined and perhaps
incapable of definition." Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057,
1059 (1954). According to Gilmore, the term represents a compromise between the two polar
extremes of the title concept: if B buys goods from A, he receives full title and can transfer it to any
subsequent purchaser; if B steals goods from A, no title is received and B cannot transfer title to any
purchaser no matter how clear the purchaser's good faith. Id. With "voidable title," if B obtains the
goods through theft or fraud he cannot keep them over the claim of A, but he can transfer sufficient
title so that a subsequent purchaser can keep the goods over A's claim. Id. This concept will protect
good faith purchasers but not parties dealing in fraud or theft. See id.
45. See, e.g., English v. Ford, 17 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 1047-48, 95 Cal. Rptr. 501, 506-07 (1971)
(dealer A, who acquired an automobile from dealer B in exchange for a check which was later
dishonored, had voidable title and could pass title to a good faith purchaser for value); House of
Stainless, Inc. v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 75 Wis. 2d 264, 270, 249 N.W.2d 561, 564 (1977) (a buyer
who had received goods on credit while insolvent, obtained only voidable title to the goods but could
transfer title to a good faith purchaser). See also supra note 38 (discussing the effect subsection 2702(3) has on the seller's remedies).
46. See U.C.C. § 2-702(3). A buyer in ordinary course is defined in subsection 1-201(9). 6ee to.
1-201(9). Subsection 1-201(9), in relevant part, provides:
"Buyer in ordinary course of business" means a person who in good faith and
without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or
security interest of a third party in the goods buys in ordinary course from a person in
the business of selling goods of that kind but does not include a pawnbroker.
Id.
47. See id. S 2-702(3). "Good faith purchaser for value" is not defined by. the Code
as a single term. Subsection 1- 201(19) provides: " 'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct
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these definitions, and it is also the most common impediment for a
third party purchaser challenging the seller's reclamation
attempt. 48 Nevertheless, because of well developed common-law
principles, and because of the specific provisions of subsection 2702(3), once it is established that the third party purchaser fits
either the definition of buyer in ordinary course or good faith
purchaser, it is clear that he will prevail over a credit seller's
49
reclamation right.
B.

RECLAIMING SELLER VS. SECURED PARTY

Of the four third party challenges, the conflict between a
50
secured creditor and a reclaiming seller is the most controversial.
However, although the methods of analysis used to resolve this
conflict are controversial, the decision reached is virtually always
51
the same - the secured party is the victor.
The lead case in this area is In re Samuels &Co. 5 2 In Samuels the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a perfected security interest
has priority over the seller's right of reclamation. 53 The case
or transaction concerned." Id S 1-201(19). Subsection 2-103(1)(b) states: " 'Good faith' in the case
of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade." Id. 5 2-103(1)(b).
Subsection 1-201(32) provides: " 'Purchase' includes taking by sale, discount, negotiation,
mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest
in property." Id. S 1-201(32). Subsection 1-201 (44), provides in part: "a person gives 'value' for
rights if he acquires them . . . (b) as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a pre-existing
claim; or (c) by accepting delivery pursuant to a pre-existing contract for purchase .
Id. § 1201(44).
48. See In re Am. Food Purveyors, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 436, 442 (N.D. Ga.
1974) (good faith requirement was not met by a secured party because he knew of the insolvent
buyer's financial plight when funds were extended); Monsanto Co. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 114
Ill. App. 3d 1078,
-, 449 N.E.2d 993, 1000 (1983) (good faith aspect not met becuase of the
purchaser's direct involvement with the insolvent buyer's operations); Liles Bros. & Son v. Wright,
638 S.W.2d 383, 386 (Tenn. 1982) (good faith requirement was not met by purchaser who had
reason to know the goods were stolen or fraudulently obtained).
49. See supra notes 38, 45 (citing cases in which the good faith purchaser prevailed over the
defrauded creditor's attempted reclamation).
50. See U.S. Billiards Co. v. Greenberger (In re Bensar Co.), 36 Bankr. 699, 701 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1984) (describing the conflict between a reclaiming seller and a secured creditor as "one of the
most perplexing and heatedly-debated issues engendered by the Uniform Commercial Code").
51. See, e.g.,
Sorrels v. Texas Bank & Trust Co., 597 F.2d 997, 1001 (5th Cir. 1979) (an unpaid
cash seller's reclamation right is subject to a good faith purchaser for value, which includes a
perfected secured party); Toyota Indus. Trucks U.S.A., Inc. v. Citizens Nat. Bank, 611 F.2d 465,
473 (3d Cir. 1979) (truck distributor could have exercised right of reclamation when drafts under a
letter of credit were dishonored, but the right would be subject to the bank's perfected security
interest); Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1245 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) cash
seller's reclamation attempt subject to financing company's security interest), cert.
denied, 429 U.S.
834 (1976); Action Indus., Inc. v. Dixie Enter. (In re Dixie Enter.), 22 Bankr. 855, 859 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1982) (stating that § 2-702 expressly protects good faith purchasers or secured parties).
But see In re Am. Food Purveyors, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 436, 440-41 (N.D. Ga.
1974) (reclaiming seller prevailed over a secured party on several alternative grounds); Monsanto
Co. v.Walter E. Heller & Co., 114 Il1. App. 3d 1078, 449 N.E. 2d 993, 999-1000 (1983) (reclaiming
seller prevailed over buyer's secured lender because the lender failed to act in good faith).
52. 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
53. Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 834 (1976). The court en banc adopted as its opinion the opinion of Judge Godbold, who
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involved the competing claims of cattle ranchers who remained
unpaid after delivering cattle to Samuels, and the claim of Samuels'
financier, C.I.T. Corporation, which had a security interest in all
of Samuels' after acquired property.5 4 The court resolved the
conflict in favor of the secured party on two alternative grounds.
Under one theory, the court classified the cattle ranchers'
reclamation rights as Article 2 security interests which, because left
unperfected, were subordinate to C.I.T.'s perfected security
interest pursuant to subsection 9-312(5). 55 The second approach
taken by the court was that C.I.T., as a secured party, qualified as
i good faith purchaser and therefore acquired full and valid title to
the property under subsection 2-403(1).56
1. The Right to Reclaim as a Security Interest
The court's classification of the reclamation right as an Article
2 security interest was based on the provisions of section 2-401.51
Under subsection 1 of section 2-401, any retention or reservation of
title in goods shipped or delivered is limited to the reservation of a
had dissented from the prior panel decision. Id. at 1241. (citing Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels &
Co.), 510 F.2d 139, 154 (5th Cir. 1975) (Godbold, J. dissenting)). Samuels involved the reclamation
attempt of a cash seller who accepted a check for payment. Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels &Co.),
510 F.2d 139, 144.(5th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
834 (1976). The principles of Samuels which defeated the cash seller's reclamation attempt, however,
arejust as applicable to the credit seller's reclamation right under S 2-702. Samuels, 526 F.2d at.124647.
54. Samuels, 510 F.2d at 143-44. Samuels was a meat packing firm involved in the buying and
processing of meat for resale. Id. The company had been financed by the C.I.T. Corporation which,
in return for its financing, had acquired a perfected security interest in Samuels' assets, inventory
and all after-acquired property, including livestock. Id. at 144. Samuels began to experience some
financial difficulties and C.I.T., believing itself to be unsecure, refused to advance further funds to
Samuels. Id. Samuels filed for bankruptcy that same day. Id. Among the creditors seeking payment
from the estate were some fifteen cattle ranchers who had delivered cattle to Samuels within ten days
prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Id.
55. Samuels, 526 F.2d at 1246-48. In classifying the cash seller's reclamation right as a security
interest the court rejected financier's argument that the security interest could not attach because the
debtor had insufficient rights in the collateral. Id. at 1247. The court also rejected the argument that
the secured party's interest collapses when the debtor loses his rights in the collateral. Id. Since both
parties had security interest in the property the court determined priority according to the provisions
of S 9-312(5). Id.; see U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1978). Subsection 9-312(5) provides, in relevant part, that
"priority between conflicting security interests in the same collateral shall be determined according
to the following rules: (a) Conflicting security interests rank according to priority in time of filing or
perfection." Id.
56. Samuels, 526 F.2d at 1242-44; see U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1978) (one with voidable title may
transfer full title to a good faith purchaser). For the text of § 2-403, see supra note 42. For a discussion
of the concept of voidable title, see supra note 44 and accompanying text.
57. See Samuels, 526 F.2d at 1246. Subsection 2-401(1), in pertinent part, provides:
Any retention or reservation by the seller of the title (property) in goods shipped or
delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest. Subject
to these provisions and to the provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions
(Article 9), title to goods passes from the seller to the buyer in any manner and on any
conditions explicitly agreed on by the parties.
U.C.C. S 2-401(l) (1978).
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security interest. 58 Accordingly, the court in Samuels reasoned that
the only interest a creditor can have in delivered goods is a security
interest. 59 The use of this approach to resolve the reclamation
versus security interest conflict has not developed much of a
60
following, and is flawed in many respects.
One obstacle to classifying the reclamation right as a security
6
interest lies within the UCC definition of "security interest.'' '
Subsection 37 of section 1-201 defines a security interest as an
interest that "secures payment or performance of an obligation. "62
The right to reclaim, as opposed to a security interest, does not
secure payment for the seller, nor does it secure the performance of
the contract by the buyer. 63 The right to reclaim is a right only to
undo the transaction; it allows the seller to rescind the contract and
64
recover goods fraudulently obtained.
Section 9-102 presents a second obstacle to classifying the right
to reclaim as a security interest. 65 Section 9-102 provides that
58. U.C.C. § 2-401(l) (1978). For the relevant text of subsection I ofS 2-401, see supra note 57.
59. Samuels, 526 F.2d at 1246. The court noted that even though most security interests covered
by Article 9 are consensual, Article 9 also covers Article 2 security interests that arise, not by
consent, but by operation of law. Id.
60. See, e.g., Basset Furniture Indus. v. Wear (In re PFA Farmers Mkt. Ass'n), 583 F.2d 992,
998 (8th Cir. 1978) (seller of furniture prevailed over trustee with status of lien creditor because.
among other things, the seller's reclamation right was not considered a security interest);Johnston &
Murphy Shoes, Inc. v. Meinhard Commercial Corp. (In re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc.), 403 F.2d 658,
660 (6th Cir. 1968) (rejecting the contention that § 2-702 creates a security interest and allowing
reclamation by shoe seller over attachment liens of creditor). But see R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v.
Eli Witt Co. (In re Eli Witt Co.), 12 Bankr. 757, 760 (M.D. Fla. 1981) (reclamation right treated as
an unperfected security interest); Styler v. Scharf (In re Metal Tech Mfg,, Inc.), 27 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 701, 706-07 (D. Utah 1979) (reclamation right treated as an unperfected security
interest).
61. See, e.g., U.S. Billiards Co. v. Greenberger (In re Bensar Co.), 36 Bankr. 699, 702, (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1984) ("the language of U.C.C. 5 2-702 does not create a 'security interest' as defined in
U.C.C. § 1-201(37)"); Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 184 Colo. 166, 175,
519 P.2d 354, 359 (1974) (right to reclaim inconsistent with the definition of security interest).
62. U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(1978). Subsection 1-201(37), in pertinent part, provides:
"Security interest" means an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures
payment or performance of an obligation. The retention or reservation of title by a
seller of goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer (Section 2-401) is
limited in effect to a reservation of a "security interest.
Id.
63. See Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 184 Colo. 166, 175, 519 P.2d
354, 359 (1974). The court in Guy Martin stated:
The right to reclaim . . . is a right to undo the transaction, not a right to "secure"
payment of the price as required by the definition of "security interest" . . . . The
right to reclaim is not a species of interest in the goods which is the result of a
transaction "intended to create a security interest" and is not created by contract
Id. (citations omitted).
64. See U.C.C. § 2-702 (1978). Under § 2-702(2) a seller of goods is entitled to repossess goods
delivered. Id. There is no right to payment or specific performance, in fact, subsection 3 excludes all
other remedies when a reclamation attempt is successful. See id. 5 2-702(3) (1978). For the text of
subsections 2 and 3 of § 2-702, see supra notes 1, 32.
65. See U.C.C. § 9-102 (1978). Section 9-102 governs the policy and subject matter of Article 9
and, in pertinent part, provides: "Article 191 applies (a) to any transaction (regardless of its form)
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Article 9 applies only to security interests created by contract or to
transactions which are intended by the parties to create a security
interest. 66 A sale of goods conducted on credit terms does not by
itself establish an intention to create a security interest, nor does it
constitute a contract for a security interest. 67 Without a specific
intention to create a security interest or a contract creating a
security interest, the reclamation right, which arises under Article
2, is not within the scope of Article 9 and should not be subject to
68
its provisions.
A third factor signaling the impropriety of classifying the right
to reclaim as a security interest lies in the implied exclusivity of
rights in section 2-702.69 Under subsections 1 and 2 of section 9504, if the reclaiming seller is classified as a secured party he is not
only entitled to the return of the goods, but is also entitled to
compensation for any deficiency of the indebtedness remaining
after a disposition of the goods. 70 This includes the expense of
retaking and selling the goods and the possibility of recovering
attorney's fees and legal expenses. 71 The opportunity for the seller
to recover more than the goods delivered conflicts with the

. This Article applies to security interests created
which is intended to create a security interest
by contract ....- Id.
66. Id. The main purpose of section 9-102 is to subject all consensual security interests to the
provisions of Article 9. Id. § 9-102 official comment (1978) (emphasis added). The principle test
of whether a transaction should be subject to the dictates of Article 9 is whether the transaction was
intended to have effect as a security interest. Id. (emphasis added).
67. See supra note 63. As stated by one court, "sellers have never understood their reclamation
right to be a security interest." Basset Furniture Indus. v. Wear (In re PFA Farmers Mkt. Assn.),
583 F.2d 992, 998 (8th Cir. 1978). Indeed, "[ilfit were deemed that the seller intended to create or
retain a security interest, he would be one of the most surprised persons in the world." 3A R.
DUESENBERG & L. KING. supra note 5, § 13.03141, at 13-39.
68. See supra note 60 (citing cases in which the court concluded that the reclamation right under
52-702(2) is not a security interest). It is possible, as the court in Samuels noted, fora security interest
to arise not only by consent or contract, but also by operation of law as indicated by § 9-113. See
Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1247 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834
(1976); U.C.C. § 9-113 (1978). Section 9-113, however, does not state when an Article 2 security
interest arises, it only directs how such interests should be treated under Article 9. See id. The text of
note 73.
9-113 is provided infra
69. See U.C.C. 5 2-702 (1978). Subsection 2 of § 2-702 provides that there is no other basis to
fraud or misrepresentation, and subsection 3 of § 2-702 provides that the
goods
obtained
by
reclaim
reclamation of goods excludes all other remedies. Id.; see alsoGuy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado
Springs Nat'l Bank, 184 Colo. 166, 175-76, 519 P.2d 354, 359 (1974). In Guy Martin the court
refused to classify the right to reclaim as a security intereb, because § 2-702 "states that successful
reclamation 'excludes all other remedies,' and the creation of a security interest (ut of the right to
reclaim might allow recover%, which would be greater than the mere recovery of goods originall,
transferred.' Id. For the text of subsections 2 and 3 of § 2-702, see supra note I and 38 respectively.
70. See U.C.C. § 9-504 (1978). Although § 9-504 would allow the reclaiming seller a recovery
greater thanlust the return of the goods, the section would also hold the seller liable to the insolvent
buyer for any surplus. Id.§ 9-504(2).
71. Id.§ 9-504( 1)(a). Additionally, if the right to reclaim was classified as a security interest, § 9306 would be applicable and thus a secured party would have a right to the proceeds realized from a
disposition of the collateral. Id. S 9-306. Such a result would be in direct conflict with subsection 3 of
§2-702 which states that the seller's right of reclamation only extends to the goods sold and the seller
has no right to any proceeds. See supra note 31 (citing cases in which courts have held that a
reclaiming seller has no rights to proceeds).
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provisions of section 2-702 which limit the reclamation recovery. 72
Finally, classifying the reclamation right as a security interest
is inconsistent with the provisions of section 9-113, the chief Article
9 section concerning Article 2 security interests. 71 Official comment
1 of section 9-113 lists several instances when a security interest
arises under Article 2. 74 The right to reclaim goods under section 2702 is not among the security interests listed. 75 A comparison
between the listed Article 2 security interests and the credit seller's
right to reclaim indicates that section 2-702 should not be classified
as an Article 2 security interest. 76 Additionally, the main import of
section 9-113 is the statement that security interests arising solely
under Article 2 do not have to meet certain Article 9 requirements
for enforceability or perfection, so long as the debtor does not have
possession of the goods. 77 But because the reclamation right arises
only after the goods have been delivered, thus giving the insolvent
buyer possession of the goods, section 9-113 is of no benefit to the
reclaiming seller. 78 Therefore, to have a valid security interest the
reclaiming seller must comply with the usual provisions of Article
72. See U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1978); Bullock v. Joe Bailey Auction Co., 580 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah
1978) (seller that reclaimed equipment was precluded from all other remedies by subsection 3 of S 2702).
73. See U.C.C. § 9-113 (1978). Section 9-113 provides:
A security interest arising solely under the Article on Sales (Article 2) is subject
to the provisions of this Article except that to the extent that and so long as the debtor
does not have or does not lawfully obtain possession of the goods
(a) no security agreement is necessary to make the security interest enforceable; and
(b) no filing is required to perfect the security interest; and
(c) the rights of the secured party on default by the debtor are governed by the Article
on Sales (Article 2).
Id.
74. See id. § 9-113 official comment no. 1. The comment, in pertinent part, provides:
Under the provisions of Article 2 on Sales, a seller of goods may reserve a security
interest (see, e.g., Sections 2-401 and 2-505); and in certain circumstances, whether or
not a security interest is reserved, the seller has rights of resale and stoppage under
Sections 2-703, 2-705 and 2-706 which are similar to the rights of a secured party.
Similarly, under such sections as Sections 2-506, 2-707 and 2-711, a financing agency,
an agent, a buyer or another person may have a security interest or other right in
goods similar to that of a seller. The use of the term "security interest" in the Sales
Article is meant to bring the interests so designated within this Article.
Id.
75. See id. Nor is there any mention in section 2-702 or its official comments that the seller
retains a security interest by delivering goods on credit. See id. § 2-702 & official comments.
76. See Basset Furniture Indus., Inc. v. Wear ( In re PFA Farmers Mkt. Ass'n), 583 F.2d 992,
998 (8th Cir. 1978). In Farmers Market the court rejected a contention that the reclamation right
constitutes a security interest by stating: "While § 9-113 indicates that some security interests are
created as a matter of law by Article 2, we find nothing in § 9-113 or its Official Comment to indicate
that the 5 2-702(2) right was classified as a security interest." Id. Section 9-113 merely encompasses
the treatment of a security interest i'-at arises under Article 2, it does not state when an Article 2
security interest is present. See U.C.C. § 9-113 (1978). The text of § 9-113 is provided supra note 73.
77. See U.C.C. § 9-113 (1978). For the text of § 9-113, see supra note 73.
78. Compare U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (1978) (reclamation right arises only after the goods have been
delivered) with id. § 9-113 (Article 2 security interests excluded from Article 9 provisions only
if debtor does not have possession of the goods).
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9.79 Once the requirements of Article 9 are complied with,
however, the seller qualifies as a bona fide Article 9 secured party
and has no need for any rights granted by section 2-702.8o
2. The Secured Party as a Purchaserfor Value
The second approach taken in Samuels, that the secured party
is a purchaser for value, is followed by virtually every court facing
the question. 8 1 In Samuels the court utilized the broad UCC
definitions of "purchase" ' and "value" 83 to conclude that the
secured party, C.I.T., was a purchaser for value.8 4 This
determination, along with the finding that C.I.T. met the good
faith requirement, 85 permitted C.I.T. to prevail over the seller's
86
attempted reclamation.
The secured party's entitlement to all the rights and privileges
of a good faith purchaser virtually destroys the seller's right of
reclamation. 7 It is probable that an insolvent buyer has at least one
79. 3A R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, supra note 5, § 13.03[41, at 13-39 to 13-40. The relevant
sections of Article 9 dealingwith enforcement and perfection of security interests are § 9-203 and § 9302. See U.C.C. SS 9-203, 9-302 .(1978). Section 9-203, in pertinent part, provides: "a security
interest is not enforceable against the debtor or third parties . . .unless . . . the debtor has signed a
security agreement which contains a description of the collateral .... - Id. § 9-203(l)(a). Section 9302 provides, in part, that '[a]financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests...
.- Id. § 9-302(1). The seller may have an unperfected security interest but its value is minimal
because it will not be enforceable without a written agreement. See id S 9-203(1)(a)) (1978).
80. See U.C.C. § 9-203 (1978) (requirements for the attachment and enforcement of a security
interest). Section 9-113 exempts security interests arising under Article 2 from complying with its
provisions only if the debtor lawfully obtains possession. Id. § 9-113 (emphasis added). The
seller could argue that the insolvent debtor did not lawfully obtain possession of the goods and
therefore the seller's security interest should be automatically enforceable and perfected under the
provisions of § 9-113. See id.
81. See, e..g., Shell Oil Co. v. Mills Oil Co., 717 F.2d 208, 212 (5th Cir. 1983) (secured party is
good faith purchaser); Los Angeles Paper Bag Co. v. James Talcott, Inc., 604 F.2d 38, 39-40
(9th Cir. 1979) (secured creditor is a good faith purchaser); U.S. Billiards Co. v. Greenberger (In
re Bensar Co.), 36 Bankr. 699, 703 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984) (secured creditors who act in good
faith qualify as good faith purchasers). But see In re Am. Food Purveyors, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 436 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1974). In American Food Purveyors the court was aware that
the definition of "purchaser" was broad enough to include a secured creditor. Id. at 441. It
nevertheless held that a secured party is not a "purchaser" because subsection 2-702(3) was
designed to protect only Article 2 "purchasers" not Article 9 secured creditors. Id.
82. See U.C.C. 51-201(32) (1978) (defining purchase). The text of section 1-201(32) is provided
supra note 47.
83. See U.C.C. 51-201(44) (1978) (defining value). The text of section 1-201(44) is provided
supra note 47.
84. Stowers v. Mahon (In reSamuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1242 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429
U.S. 834(1976).
85. See U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1978). Subsection 1-201(19) requires "honesty in fact" to qualify as
a good faith purchaser. Id. In addition, § 2-103(1)(b) requires "reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing." Id. § 2-103(1)(b). In Samuels there was no evidence or claim that the secured party had
acted in bad faith, and even though the secured party may have had knowledge of the debtors
outstanding claims the court concluded that the good faith provisions were satisfied. Samuels, 526
F.2d at 1243-44.
86. Samuels, 526 F.2d at 1244.
87. See generally Anderson, The Reclaiming Seller Under UCCSection 2-702 vs.His FourHorsemen of the
Apocalypse, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 271, 278-79 (1976). Under both the common law and the Code a
secured party must qualify as a good faith purchaser in order to recover against a reclaiming seller.
Id. at 276-79. However, the definition of good faith purchaser is much broader under the UCC
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financier who has secured the advancement of funds with a
perfected security interest, and in such a situation the unpaid seller
is denied his claim. 88 A financier with a security interest in after
acquired property experiences an increase in security when the
insolvent buyer purchases goods on credit, though he neither relies
on the buyer's ownership of the goods nor advances funds after
delivery.8 9 The unjustness of this windfall to a financier, at the
expense of an innocent credit seller, is clear and difficult to
reconcile.90

Although a security interest seems to fit perfectly within the
definition of "purchase for value," such an application can bring
about results that are not in harmony with other provisions of the
Code. 9 1 One possible implication causes an upheaval in the Article
9 rules or priority. 92 The analysis that grants "purchaser" status to
a perfected security interest is equally applicable to an unperfected
than it was at common law. Id. The difference at common law was not that a good faith purchaser
did not prevail, but rather, that a secured party generally would not qualify as a "good faith
purchaser for value." 2 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS § 620 (2d ed. 1924).
Furthermore, the Code does not continue the common-law requirement that a "good faith"
purchaser be unaware of adverse claims to the property. Compare id. § 621 (bona fide purchaser must
inquire when he has knowledge which would put a reasonable man on notice) with U.C.C. g 1201(19) (1978) and id. § 2-103(l)(b) (requirement only of"honesty in fact").
88. Anderson, supra note 87, at 279; see, e.g., Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels &Co.), 526 F.2d
1238, 1242 (5th Cir.) (secured creditor of' insolvent buyer prevailed over unpaid seller), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 834 (1976); U.S. Billiards Co. v. Greenberger (In re Bensar Co.), 36 Bankr. 699, 703
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984) (secured creditor prevailcd); R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Eli Witt Co.
(In re Eli Witt Co.), 12 Bankr. 757, 760 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) (secured creditor.prevailed over
reclaiming seller).
89. Anderson, supra note 87, at 280. The secured party with a security interest in after acquired
property is deemed to give "new value" whenever the debtor acquires additional collateral. See
U.C.C. § 9-108 (1978). However, the debtor must acquire the property in the ordinary course or
pursuant to the security agreement. See id.
90. See Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1242 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 834 (1976). Any perceived inequities of the holding in Samuels were dealt with by Judge
Godbold as follows: "We do not sit as federal chancellors confecting ways to escape the state law of
commercial transactions when that law produces a result not to our tastes. Doing what seems fair is
heady stuff. . . . Today's heady drought may give . . . (an) euphoric feeling, but it can produce
tomorrow's hangover." Id. The court also justified its decision by noting that the seller's could have
"protected their interest if they had merely complied with the UCC purchase
money provisions. Id.
at 1247-48. However, even though a purchase money security interest would give the seller priority,
once these provisions are complied with the seller has no need for the reclamation right granted by §
2-702(2). See 3A R. DUESENBERO & L. KING, supra note 5, § 13.03[41; seealso supra notes 78-80 and
accompanying text.
91. See Anderson, supra note 87 at 279; Skilton, Security Interests in After-Acquired Property Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 925, 945 (1974). Skilton preceived the inequity of the
secured party's victory but seems to have sided with stable interpretations of the UCC provisions:
Fireside equities may seem to favor the seller over the secured party who did not
give new value in latching on to the after-acquired property. The secured party with
the after-acquired property clause may seem to get a windfall at the expense of the
sellers, who provided the property. But it is hard to quarrel with the decision as an
application of statutory provisions.
Id. (commenting on In re Hayward Woolen Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1107 (2d Cir.
1967) (emphasis in original).
92. Anderson, supra note 87, at 279; seeU.C.C. § 9-301(1) (1978). Subsection I of § 9-301, in
pertinent part, provides: "an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of... a person
who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is perfected." Id. § 9-301(1)(b).

246

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

62: 231

security interest.9 3 If an unperfected secured partyhad the status of
a purchaser, then under subsection 2-702(3) he could defeat the
seller's reclamation action. 9 4 This result would be particularly
troublesome in those jurisdictions that have amended subsection 3
of section 2-702 by deleting "or lien creditor" in order to provide
the reclaiming seller priority over a lien creditor. 95 Under
subsection 1(b) of section 9-301, an unperfected security interest is
subordinate to the claim of a lien creditor. 96 However, if an
unperfected security interest can defeat a reclamation attempt while
a lien creditor cannot, the intent and purpose behind subsection 997
301(1)(b) would be bypassed.
Additionally, the finding that a secured party is a purchaser
does not pay heed to the preamble of section 1-201, which states
that the definitions of the section are inapplicable if the context so
requires. 98 The context should render the definition of
"purchaser" inapplicable to the secured party because section 2102 provides that the provisions of Article 2 do not apply to security
interests. 99 However, section 2-403 of Article 2 is the vehicle which
gives the secured party priority over the reclaiming seller. 100 The
classification of the secured party as a purchaser under section 1201 is also improper because subsection 4 of section 2-403 states
that the rights of "other purchasers" are governed by Article 9.101
A final flaw in the reasoning that allows the secured party a
superior interest in the goods exists in the wording of subsection 1
of section 2-403.102 The subsection states that a person with
voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith
93. Anderson, supra note 87, at 279; see supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text. The analysis
makes no distinction between a perfected or unperfected security interest. See id.
94. See U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1978) (seller's right to reclaim subject to the rights of good faith
purchaser). For the text of § 2-702(3), see supra note 32.
95. For a list of jurisdictions that have amended § 2-702(3), see infra note 112. For the effect of
the amendment, see infra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
96. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1978).
97. Compare id. (unpcrfected secured party subordinate to lien creditor) and id. § 2-702(3) (lien
creditor subordinate to reclaiming seller) with supra note 93 and accompanying text (reclaiming seller
subordinate to unperfected secured party).
98. Anderson, supra note 87, at 280, see U.C.C. § 1-201 (1978).
99. SeeU.G.C. § 2-102 (1978). Section 2-102 states, in pertinent part, that "Article [21 . . . does
not apply to any transaction which ... is intended to operate only as a security transaction." Id.
100. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
101. Anderson, supra note 87, at 281; see U.C.C. § 2-403(4) (1978). While § 2-403 subjects the
rights of other purchasers to Article 9, there is no instruction concerning what constitutes "other
purchasers." See id. Good faith purchasers for value are the main subject of section 2-403,
but, every "purchase" is "for value." See id. § 1-201(32), (34). Moreover every duty and contract
includes an obligation of good faith. See id. § 1-203. But even though a secured party may fit the
definition of "good faith purchaser for value" the secured party should be considered an "other
purchaser" subject to the rules of Article 9 because the context so requires, and because section 2403(4) gives a cross reference to Article 9. See id. § 2-403(4).
102. Anderson, supra note 87, at 280; see U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1978) (permitting a secured party
as "good faith purchaser" to acquire full title from a person with voidable title).
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purchaser for value. 10 3 It does not necessarily follow, however, that
a person with voidable title has the power to transfer a security
interest to a good faith purchaser for value. 104
To summarize, the finding that section 2-702 gives a third
party purchaser an Article 2 security interest is not supported by
the Code and results in a serious diminution of the reclamation
right. 10 5 The finding that the secured party is a "purchaser for
value," although conveniently fitting within Code definitions,
gives the secured party an undeserved windfall when he has neither
advanced new value nor relied upon the debtor's ownership of the
goods. 0 6 This inequity can be avoided by a stricter reading of the
07
provisions that lead to the result. 1
C.

RECLAIMING SELLER vs. LIEN CREDITOR

The claim of a lien creditor provides the most complex and
intricate third party contest for a reclaiming seller. 10 8 The
complexity results from both a circuitous journey through Code
cross references and an amendment to section 2-702 recommended
by the Code's Permanent Editorial Board in 1966.09 The 1962
version of subsection 3 of section 2-702 provides, in relevant part,
that "[t]he seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject
to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith
purchaser or lien creditor under this Article (Section 2-403)."110 The
amendment strikes the words "or lien creditor" from subsection
3."'1 The amendment has been adopted in twenty-five
103. SeeU.C.C. S 2-403(1) (1978). The insolvent buyer who obtains goods on credit is deemed
to have voidable title. See supra note 44.
104. Anderson, supra note 87, at 280. The author notes that the Code distinguishes between title
and security interest. Id. at 281. The concept of title usually'means rights of ownership, while a
security interest only secures performance of an obligation. Id. af 280; seealso U.C.C. 5 2-401 (1978)
(any retention of interest in delivered property is limited to a security interest).
105. 3ee supra notes 61-o8 and accompanying LA.. The reclamation right does not fit the
definition of "security interest." E.g., Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 184
Colo. 166, 175, 519 P.2d 354, 359 (1971).
106. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
107. See Lavonia Mtg. Co. v. Emery Corp. (In reEmery Corp.), 38 Bankr. 489 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1984), rev'd, 52 Bankr. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1985). In Enery a reclaiming seller prevailed over a secured
party because the court concluded that the secured party did not qualify as a good faith purchaser.
Id. This result would continue the common-lav rule. See supra note 87.
1.08.
See 3A R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, supra note 5, 5 13.03[41[d] Iii (demonstrating the futility
of attempting to use the provisions of the Code to resolve the lien versus reclamation conflict in the
unamended S 2-702).
109. See generally Anderson, supra note 87, at 282-88 (discussing the uncertainty surrounding the
conflict between a lien creditor and reclaiming seller).
110. U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1962) (amended 1978).
111. Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, Report No. 3 at 3 (1967).
Six states, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, New Jersey, New Mexico, and New York, had
already deleted the phrase "or lien creditor" from S 2-702(3) before the Editorial Board made its
official recommendation. See id.
112. The following jurisdictions have amended subsection 3 of 5 2-702 by deleting the words "or
lien creditor": Arkansas (see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-702 (Supp. 1985)); California (see CAL. COM.
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112

jurisdictions.
Twenty-six jurisdictions have retained the
unamended version.' 13 The conflict between a reclaiming seller
and a lien creditor is subject to numerous judicial interpretations
which vary according to whether or not the jurisdiction has
4
adopted the amendment. 1
1. The Unamended Section 2-702." The Effect of "or Lien
Creditor"
Courts differ as to which party, reclaiming seller or lien
creditor, prevails under the unamended version of section 2-702.115
The solution to the conflict is further complicated by the utilization
of two different methods to resolve the issue: some courts
supplement the 2-702 reclamation right with pre-Code law," 6 while
other courts analyze the contest strictly within the provisions of the
Code.

1 17

CODE S 2-702 (West 1964)); Colorado (see COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-2-702 (Supp. 1985)); Connecticut
(see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. S 42a-2-702 (West Supp. 1986)); District of Columbia (see D.C. CODE
ANN. § 28:2-702 (Supp. 1985)); Florida (see FLA. STAT. ANN. S 672.702 (West Supp. 1986)); Illinois
(see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-702 (Smith-Hurd 1963)); Indiana (see IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-2-702
(Burns Supp. 1986)): Iowa (see IOWA CODE ANN. S 554.2702 (West Supp. 1986)); Kansas (see KAN.
STAT. ANN. S 84-2-702 (1983)); Maine (see ME. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. S 2-702 (Supp. 1985));
Minnesota (see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.2-702 (West Supp. 1986)); Mississippi (seeMiss. CODE ANN.
§ 75-2-702 (1972)); Montana (see MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-702 (1985)); New Jersey (see N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 12A:2-702 (West Supp. 1986)); New Mexico (see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-702 (1978)); New
York (see N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 2-702 (McKinney 1964)); North Carolina (see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 252-702 (Supp. 1985)); North Dakota (see N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-81 (1983)); Oklahoma (see OK.A.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-702 (West Supp. 1985)); Pennsylvania (see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2702
(Purdon 1984)); Washington (see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-702 (Supp. 1986)); Wisconsin (see
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 402.702 (West Supp. 1985)); Wyoming (seeWyo. STAT. § 34-21-281 (1977)). See
generally 67A AM. JuR. 2D Sales § 1026 (2d ed. 1985).
113. Jurisdictions which have not amended subsection 3 of § 2-702 include the following:
Alabama (see ALA. CODE S 7-2-702 (1984)); Alaska (see ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.702 (1980)); Arizona
(see AIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-2702 (1985)); Delaware (seeDEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-702 (1974));
Georgia (see GA. CODE ANN. § 109A-2-702 (Harrison Supp. 1984)); Hawaii (see HAWAII REV. STAT. §
490-2-702 (1976)); Idaho (see IDAHO CODE § 28-2-702 (1980)); Kentucky (see Ky. REV. STAT. § 355.2702 (1972)); Massachusetts (see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-702 (West 1958)); Michigan (see
MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 440.2702 (West 1967)); Missouri (see Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.2-702
(Vernon 1965)); Nebraska (see NEB. REV. STAT. § 91-2-702 (1980)); Nevada (see NEV. REV. STAT. 5
104.2702 (1985)); New Hampshire (see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:2-702 (1961)); Ohio (seeOHo
REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.76 (Page 1979)); Oregon (see OR. REV. STAT. § 72.7020 (1985)); Rhode
Island (see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-2-702 (1985)); South Carolina (see S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-702
(Law. Co-op. 1976)); South Dakota (see S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 57A-2-702 (1980)); Tennessee
(seeTENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-702 (1979)); Texas (seeTEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 2.702 (Vernon
1968)); Utah (see UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-702 (1980)); Vermont (see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2702 (1966)); Virginia (see VA. CODE S 8.2-702 (1965)); West Virginia (see W.VA. CODE § 46-2-702
(1966)); Virgin Islands (see V.I. ConE ANN. tit. 1 A, § 2-702 (1965)). See generally 67A AM. JUR. 2D
Sales § 1026 (2d ed. 1985).
114. Compare infra notes 127, 146, 154 (interpreting the unamended 5 2-702) with infra note 167
(interpreting the amended § 2-702).
115. Compare Ray-O-Vac v. Daylin, Inc. (In re Daylin, Inc.), 596 F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 1979)
(fraudulent buyer received only voidable title which was not subject to attachment by lien creditor)
with In re Behring & Behring, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 600, 607 (N.D. Tex. 1968) (§ 2702(3) expressly provided for the lien creditor to prevail).
116. For a discussion of cases referring to pre-Code law, see infra note 118 and accompanying
text.Ifa court determines that § 2-702 does not displace state law, then the court can utilize §1-103,
which preserves common-law principles unless displaced by the Code. SeeU.C.C. § 1-103 (1978).
117. For a discussion of cases in which courts have declined to refer to pre-Code law, see infra
notes 153-54 and accompanying text. Incorporating the common law into § 2-702(3) may be at odds
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a. The Use of Pre-Code Law
In addition to the split between a strict Code analysis or a
resort to common law, courts using the pre-Code analysis have
employed two different methods to resolve the conflict between the
reclaiming seller and the lien creditor. 118 The first of these methods
resolves the conflict by examining the pre-Code law of the
particular state where the contest arose. 119 Resort to the pre-Code
law of a particular state originated in In re Kravitz. 120 Kravitz was
one of the first cases to examine the contest between a lien creditor
and a seller reclaiming under section 2-702, and is also the case
which provoked the amendment of subsection 3,121
In Kravitz the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that
a bankrupt buyer's trustee, as an "ideal lien creditor,"' 122 possessed
23
a right to the goods superior to the right of a reclaiming seller.1
The court relied upon the provisions of UCC section 1-103 in
concluding that Pennsylvania's pre-Code law determined the
priority of the claims. 24 The court stated that under the common
with the Code's rules of construction. See U.C.C. S 1-102 (1978). Section 1-102 provides that the
Code should be construed and applied to promote clarity and uniformity of the law among the
various jurisdictions. Id. § 1-102(2)(a), (c). Pre-Code common law concerning the relative rights of
reclaiming sellers against lien creditors is neither uniform nor clear, See generally Hawkland, The
Relative Rights of Lien Creditors and DefraudedSellers -A mending the Uniform Commercial Code to Conform to
the Kravitz Case, 67 CoM. L.J. 86 (1962) (exploring the difficulty of interpreting the 5 2-702
reclamation right in view of the hazy common law).
118. Compare In re Kravitz 278 F.2d 820, 822 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1960) (pre-Code law of
Pennsylvania gives priority to intervening lien) and Johnston & Murphy Shoes, Inc. v. Meinhard
Commercial Corp. (In re Mel Golde Shoes), 403 F.2d 658, 660 (6th Cir. 1968) (concluding, after a
thorough examination of the Code, that Kentucky pre-Code law favored reclaiming seller) with RayO-Vac v. Daylin, Inc. (In re Daylin), 596 F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 1979) (seller prevails over lien
creditor pursuant to general common law).
119. See infra note 127. The pre-Code law is examined pursuant to § 1-103 which provides that
Code provisions may be supplemented by general principles of law. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978). The
text of S 1-103 is provided supra note 33.
120. 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960).
121. See Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, Report No. 3, at 3
(1967). The holding in Kravitz made the reclamation right invalid in bankruptcy proceedings in states
in which the pre-Code law of reclamation allowed an intervening lien creditor to prevail over the
reclaiming seller. Id. The right of reclamation against a lien creditor was rendered almost entirely
illusory in these states because of the high probability of an insolvent buyer going bankrupt. See id. In
most states the pre-Code law was otherwise, and the right of reclamation remained fully effective. Id.
For a discussion of the result of a conflict between a reclaiming seller and a lien creditor at common
law, see supra note 21 and accompanying text. The Editorial Board initially recommended against
adoption of the amendment because it was "not convinced that the decision in In re Kravitz requires
an amendment of this section." Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code,
Report No. 1, at 70 (1962).
122. Kravitz, 278 F.2d at 822. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 a trustee was deemed vested
with all the rights of a lien creditor whether or not such a creditor actually existed. See Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70, 30 Stat. 544, 566 (1898), amended by Act ofJuly 7, 1952, ch. 579, § 22(e),
66 Stat. 420, 430 (1952) (current version at 11 U.S.C. 544(a) (1982)). Under 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) the
trustee became "the ideal creditor, irreproachable and without notice, armed cap-a-pie with every
right and power which is conferred by the law of the state upon its most favored creditor who has
acquired a lien by legal or equitable proceedings." In re Waynesboro Motor Co., 60 F.2d 668, 669
(S.D. Miss. 1932). The trustee also qualifies as a lien creditor under the UCC. See U.C.C. S9-301(3)
(1978).
123. Kravitz, 278 F.2d at 822.
124. Id. at 822 n.3. The text of § 1-103 is provided supra note 33.
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law of Pennsylvania, the reclaiming seller has priority over the
claim of a lien creditor unless the lien creditor extended credit
to the insolvent buyer after the goods were sold. 12 5 The court
determined that the trustee had the same status as an intervening
lien creditor, 126 and therefore denied the seller's reclamation
attempt. 127
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in In re Mel Golde Shoes, 128
used the same analysis as that set forth in Kravitz but reached a
different result, concluding that the reclaiming seller's right was
superior to the rights of lien creditors. 12 9 The court in Mel Golde
Shoes not only reached a different result than the court in Kravitz,
but also made a thorough examination of all relevant Code
provisions before resorting to pre-Code law. 130 This genuine but
unsuccessful effort to resolve the contest within the confines of the
Code demonstrates the inadequacies of the unamended subsection
2-702(3). 131
In resolving the conflict between the reclaiming seller and a
lien creditor, the court in Mel Golde Shoes gave initial attention to the
unamended subsection 3 of section 2-702, which states that the
reclamation right is subject to the rights of a lien creditor under
125. Kravitz, 278 F.2d at 822-23. In determining what rights an ideal lien creditor has in
Pennsylvania, the court stated:
We think that the Pennsylvania law gives certain lien creditors a higher claim than
that of a defrauded seller and that such precedent governs this case even assuming the
It has never been held, in this state, that, as
seller to have been defrauded in fact ....
against an attachment or execution on a debt contracted subsequent to the alleged
voidable sale, the vendor could rescind, and reclaim the goods. On the contrary... the
.. '' [Tihis principle so far as we
rule that he cannot do so in approvingly recognized
can ascertain, has never been overruled or modified in Pennsylvania.
Id. at 822 (citations omitted).
126, Id. at 822-23. A lien is "intervening" if the creditor extended credit after delivery of the
goods and prior to reclamation. See id. at 822.
127. Id. at 823. Numerous cases have followed the analysis set forth in Kravitz. SeeJohnston &
Murphy Shoes, Inc. v. Meinhard Commercial Corp. (In re Mel Golde Shoes), 403 F.2d 658, 660
(6th Cir. 1968) (under Kentucky pre-Code law, reclaiming seller prevails); In re Kee Lox Mfg. Co.,
22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 938, 944 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1977) (explicitly following Kravitz);
In re Royalty Homes, Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 61, 65 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1970)
(under Tennessee pre-Code law reclamation prevailed over lien); In re Eastern Supply Co., I
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 151, 154 (W.D. Pa. 1963) (under Pennsylvania law intervening lien
prevails), af/'d, 331 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1964).
128. 403 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1968).
129. Johnston & Murphy Shoes, Inc. v. Meinhard Commercial Corp. (In re Mel Golde Shoes),
403 F.2d 658, 659-61 (6th Cir. 1968). The creditors in Mel Golde Shoes had become "lien creditors"
by virtue of an attachment levied before the demand for reclamation was made. Id. at 659. Both the
reclamation demand and lien were attained before the buyer filed his bankruptcy petition. Id.
5
130. Id. at 6 9-61. Although the court in each case made its final determination according to the
particular state's pre-Code law, the court in Kravitz took this approach without trying to resolve the
conflict within the Code's provisions, while the court in Mel Golde Shoes first examined every relevant
Code provision. Compare In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960) with In re Mel Golde Shoes, 403
F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1968).
131. See infra notes 133-42 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties in resolving the
conflict between the reclaiming seller and lien creditor under the unamended § 2-702(3)).
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Article 2.132 For a determination of the Article 2 rights of a lien
creditor, the unamended subsection provides a cross reference to
133
section 2-403, which deals with the transferability of title.
However, the only mention of a lien creditor's rights in section 2403 is in subsection 4, which provides that the rights of lien
creditors are governed not by section 2-403 or Article 2, but by the
Articles on secured transactions, bulk transfers, and documents of
title.'

34

The court stated that the Articles on bulk transfers135 and

documents of title 1 36 have no relevance to the rights of a lien
creditor contesting a seller's right to reclaim. 137 Additionally, the
court stated that the only relevant section within the Article on
Secured Transactions is section 9-301, but it deals only with
conflicts between lien creditors and secured parties, not unpaid
38
sellers of goods on credit. 1
The lien creditors in Mel Golde Shoes contended that the
reclamation right constituted an Article 2 security interest, which,
because it was left unperfected by the seller, was subject to their
liens pursuant to section 9-301.139 The court rejected this
contention on two grounds. 140 First, the court noted, a reclaiming
41
seller does not assert the reclamation right as a security interest.1
Second, the court stated that the provisions of Article 9 and section
132. Mel Golde Shoes, 403 F.2d at 659; see U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1962) (amended 1978). For the text
of unamended § 2-702(3), see supra note 109 and accompanying text.
133. See U.C.C. 5 2-702(3) (1962) (amended 1978); id.§ 2-403. The relevant provisions of 5 2403 (which are identical in the 1962 and 1978 versions) are provided supra note 42 and infra note 134.
134. See U.C.C. § 2-403(4) (1978). Subsection 4 of § 2-403 provides: "The rights of other
purchasers of goods and of lien creditors are governed by the Articles on Secured Transactions (Article
9), Bulk Transfers (Article 6) and Documents of Title (Article 7)." Id. (emphasis added).
135. The UCC defines a bulk transfer as follows: "A bulk transfer is any transfer in bulk and
not in the ordinary course of the transferor's business of a major part of the materials, supplies,
merchandise or other inventory of an enterprise [whose principle business is the sale of merchandise
from stocki. Id. § 6-102(1), (3).
136. "Documents of title" refers to any "document which in the regular course of business or
financing is treated as adequately evidencing that the person in possession of it is entitled to receive,
hold and dispose of the document and the goods it covers." Id. § 1-201(15).
137. Mel Golde Shoes, 403 F.2d at 659. The court did not explain why neither Article 6 (Bulk
Transfers) nor Article 7 (Documents of Title) was relevant. See id.
138. Id. at 659-60; see also 3A R. DUESENBERG & L. KING supra note 5, § 13.03[4], at 13-36 to 1337 (stating that § 2-403 and the cross references therein are useless in determining the rights of a lien
creditor).
139. Mel Golde Shoes, 403 F.2d at 660; see U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (1978). Subsection 9-301(1)
provides, in relevant part, that "an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of. . .a
person who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is perfected." Id.
140. Mel Golde Shoes, 403 F.2d at 660. For a full discussion on the question of whether the seller's
right to reclamation constitutes a security interest, see text beginning at supra note 57.
141. Mel Golde Shoes, 403 F.2d at 660. In dismissing the contention that the reclamation right is
a security interest, the court stated.
We do not read the quoted section of the statute as defining or throwing any light upon
the "rights" of a "lien creditor" vis-a-vis the right of reclamation of a defrauded seller
under [§ 2-702]. This latter right is not a "security interest" in the goods sold and [the
sellers] are not attempting to assert a "security interest" to support their position.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REvIEW

[VoL. 62:231

9-301 were irrelevant in determining the rights of lien creditors in
relation to the reclamation right because the provisions do not
1 42
classify the right to reclaim as a security interest.
Only after this unavailing examination of all relevant Code
provisions did the court turn to pre-Code law for an answer. 143 The
court ruled in favor of the seller pursuant to Kentucky's pre-Code
44
law, which gives a reclaiming seller priority over a lien creditor.1
The second method of resolving the contest between a
reclaiming seller and a lien creditor by resorting to pre-Code law is
illustrated by the case of In re Daylin. 145 In Daylin the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the seller's reclamation right is superior
to the rights of a lien creditor. 146 The court viewed section 2-702 as
the exact equivalent of the common-law remedy of rescission for
fraud. 1 4 7 At comrnon law, a fraudulent buyer took only voidable
title from the moment of sale, and as a result, a lien creditor was
unable to prevent the retroactive reversion of title to the reclaiming
seller. 1 48 Under this analysis, the court reasoned that even though
subsection 2-702(3) subjects the reclamation right to the rights of
lien creditors, the lien creditor has no rights against a reclaiming
seller. 1 49 The court essentially considered the words "or lien
creditor" in subsection 3 to be pure surplusage, and thereby
142. Id. Section 9-301 states that an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of
a lien creditor. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1978). It does not state whether the reclamation right is a
security interest. See id. For the relevant text of § 9-301, see supra note 139.
143. Mel GoldeShoes, 403 F.2d at 660. In the words of the court:
Thus, at the end of this circuitous statutory journey, we arrive at the conclusion that
Kentucky's Commercial Code does not contain any provision defining the relative
priorities of a creditor as against a reclaiming seller. Such being the situation, we must
turn to relevant common law of Kentucky for the needed answer.
Id.
144. Id. (citing Lane & Bartlett v. Robinson, 57 Ky. Rep. 496 (1857) (holding that a defrauded
seller's right to reclaim is superior to any right of attaching creditors) and In re Monson, 127 F. Supp.
625 (W.D. Ky. 1955) (recognizing and enforcing the priority of a defrauded seller's right of
reclamation over the liens of a trustee in bankruptcy)).
145. 596 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1979).
146. Ray-O-Vac v. Daylin, Inc. (In re Daylin, Inc), 596 F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 1979).
147. Id. at 856 (citing Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. Holzman (In re Telemart Enter.), 524 F.2d 761,
765 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 969 (1976)).
148. For a discussion of the right to reclaim as the common-law remedy of rescission, see supra
notes 13-21 and accompanying text.
149. Daylin, 596 F.2d at 856. In explaining why the words "or lien creditor" in § 2-702 had to
be ignored the court stated:
We recognize that the effect of our holding is to treat the words "or lien creditor"
as mere surplusage. If the reclaiming seller's right is the right to rescind the
transaction and void the title taken by the insolvent buyer, then only a good faith
purchaser for value can cut off the seller's right. The provision that the reclaiming
seller's right is "subject to the rights" of a lien creditor is a nullity, for if the bankrupt
took only voidable title no lien creditor can have any rights in the property as against
the reclaiming seller.
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avoided a search through either the Code or the state's pre-Code
1 50
common law.
b. Analysis Within the Code
Courts use three different methods to resolve the reclamationlien conflict under the unamended section 2-702 that do not resort
to pre-Code law. 15 ' The first method is illustrated byIn re Behring &
Behring,15 2 in which the court considered the "or lien creditor"
language of subsection 3 a direct subordination of the reclamation
right to the claim of a lien creditor.1 53 This simple and
straightforward reading of subsection 2-702(3) avoids any complex
54
examination of state pre-Code law or Code cross references.
However, it also ignores the express wording of the unamended
subsection 3, which necessitates ascertaining a lien creditor's
rights. 155
The second method is characterized by In re Samuels & Co. 156
In Samuels the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a lien
creditor prevails over any attempt to reclaim.' 5 7 The court reached
this result by classifying the reclamation right as an Article 2
security interest.1 58 Because the seller's security interest remained
150. See id. The court noted that these approaches - examining the Code or the particular
state's pre-Code common law - had been used in other cases but concluded that because of
precedent neither approach was open to them. Id. at 856 & nn.4, 5.
151. See infra notes 153, 160, 164 and accompanying text.
152.5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 600 (N.D. Tex. 1968).
153. In re Behring & Behring, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 600, 607 (N.D. Tex. 1968).
Behring involved the attempt of a credit seller to reclaim a shipment of cotton made to a buyer who
later went bankrupt. Id. at 601-02.
154. See id. at 607. Other courts have followed this interpretation of S 2-702(3). See, e.g., In re
Kirk Kabinets, Inc., 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 746, 749 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1974) (rights of
a seller who had received a check for his goods which was later dishonored were inferior to a buyer's
trustee in bankruptcy acting as a lien creditor); In re Goodson Steel Corp., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 387, 392 (S.D. Tex. 1968) (bankruptcy trustee, acting as a lien creditor, cuts off the
seller's right to reclaim); In re Units, Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 46, 49 (D. Conn. 1965)
(trustee's rights as a lien creditor extinguish any rights of reclaiming seller who received a written
misrepresentation of solvency).
155. See U.C.C, S 2-702(3) (1962) (amended 1978). Because the unamended § 2-702(3) refers to
the rights of lien creditors and because it provides a cross reference to determine those rights, it
should follow that the subsection does not directly subject the reclamation right to a licn. See id.
156. 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976).
157. Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1248 (5th Cir. 1976). The lien
creditor in Samuels was actually a trustee in bankruptcy. See id. For a discussion of the trustee as lien
creditor, see supra note 122.
158. Samuels, 526 F.2d at 1246-47. The reclamation right was classified as a security interest
according to the provisions of § 2-401 which provide: "Any retention or reservation by the seller of
the title (property) in goods shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a
security interest." Id. at 1246; see U.C.C. § 2-401(1) (1978). The courts characterization of the lien.
as superior to the credit seller's right of reclamation is also reflected by its statement that, "[]ien
creditors are included in the definition of purchasers... . " Samuels, 526 F.2d at 1243 (emphasis
added). Additionally, the court stated that the credit seller's reclamation right "can never be
asserted to defeat the interests of certain third parties who have dealt with the defrauding buyer."
Id. at 1244. The court also cited 5 2-702(3) to support its conclusion that the right of a lien creditor is
superior to the reclamation right. See id.
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unperfected the court determined that it was subordinate to the
claim of a lien creditor pursuant to section 9-301.1-9 The
classification of the section 2-702 reclamation right as a security
interest, however, is not accepted by most of the courts facing the
160
question because of its many flaws.
The third and final method of analysis utilized in resolving the
conflict between the reclaiming seller and the lien creditor under
the unamended subsection 2-702(3) is exemplified by In re PFA
Farmers Market Association. 161 In FarmersMarket the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit held that a seller's right to reclaim is superior
to the claim of any lien creditor. 16 2 The court looked to the express
wording of subsection 2-702(3) which provides that the reclamation
right is subject to the rights of lien creditors under Article 2.163
Since the rights of a lien creditor could not be ascertained from any
of the relevant Code provisions, the court concluded that a lien
creditor has no rights against a reclaiming seller. 1 64 The court
justified the holding by interpreting subsection 2-702(2) as a
simplified and expanded version of the common-law reclamation
right, 165 and noted that the Code's policy of uniformity was
furthered by avoiding any dependence upon obscure variations in
state common law.

66

1

2. Amending Jurisdictions -

the Effect of Omitting "or Lien

iCreditor"
The case law under the amended version of section 2-702 is
virtually nonexistent. 1 67 The absence of case law is probably due to
159. Samuels, 526 F.2d at 1248. The relevant text of S 9-301 is provided supra note 92.
160. See supra note 60. For a full discussion of the ight to reclaim as a security interest, see text
beginning at supra note 57.
161. 583 F.2d 992 (8th Cir. 1978).
162. Bassett Furniture Indus. Inc. v. Wear (In re PFA Farmers Mkt. Ass'n), 583 F.2d 992, 1000
(8th Cir. 1978). The seller had sold furniture on open credit and shipped it to a buyer who filed for
bankruptcy seven days later. Id. at 993. The seller prevailed over the trustee acting as a hypothetical
lien creditor. Id. at 1000.
163. Id. at 997; see U.C.C. S 2-702(3) (1962) (amended 1978). For the text of the unamended
2-702(3), see text accompanying supra note 110.
164. FarmersMkI., 583 F.2d at 1000.
165. Id. The seller's right to reclaim is simplified by not requiring him to prove fraud as was
necessary at common law. See U.C.C. § 2-702 (1978) official comment no. 2. The right is expanded
because it can come into effect within any credit sale. See id. § 2-702(2); cf. supra notes 13-18 and
accompanying text (discussing common-law limitations concerning the credit seller's right to
reclaim).
166. FarmersMkt, 583 F.2d at 1000; see U.C.C. 1-102 (1978). Section 1-102, in relevant part,
provides: "This act shall be liberally contrued and applied to . . . simplify, clarify and modernize the
law governing commercial transactions . . . [andj (o make uniform the law among the various
jurisdictions." Id. § 1-201(1), (2).
167. But cf Ray-O-Vac v. Daylin, Inc. (In re Daylin, Inc.), 596 F.2d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 1979)
(upholding, without ceremony or delay, the reclamation right over a trustee in bankruptcy as lien
creditor under the amended version of § 2-702(3); Holiday Rambler Corp. v. Morris, 32 U.C.C.
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the clear intent of the amendment.168 Because the amended
subsection 2-702(3) subordinates the reclamation right only to a
purchaser, it should be read as granting the reclaiming seller
169
priority over a lien creditor.
There is, however, the possibility that the reclamation right
could still be supplemented by a state's pre-Code law. 170 This
interpretation is possible because section 1-103 allows the
utilization of prior law unless it has been expressly displaced by a
particular Code provision.17 1 The amendment only strikes the
words "or lien creditor" from subsection 3, and thereby leaves
open the question of whether common-law principles are applicable
172
to determine a lien creditor's status.
However, because of the amendment's legislative history, and
because subsection 3 expressly subjects the reclamation right to
only buyers in the ordinary course and good faith purchasers, the
amendment should resolve the reclamation-lien confict in favor of
the reclaiming seller. 173 Since the original version of section 2-702 is
subject to a myriad of conflicting interpretations, the amendment
to subsection 3 should be adopted in order to end the confusion
74
and achieve uniformity. 1
D.

RECLAIMING SELLER vs. TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY

At common law, a defrauded credit seller passed only
voidable title to a buyer, and if payment was not made, the seller
could rescind the contract and reclaim the goods. 175 This commonRep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1222, 1226-(D. Kan. 1981) (stating that because "or lien creditor" was
deleted, a reclamation right might defeat a secured party), afJ'd, 723 F.2d 1449 (10th Cir. 1983); In re
Hardin, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 857, 864 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1971) (discussing, in dicta,
the effects of the amended version of 5 2-702(3)), aff'd, 458 F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1972).
168. For a discs ssion of the purpose behind the amendment of S 2-702(3), see supra note 121
and accompanying text.
169. See R. ALDERMAN, supra note 5, S 1.81-40, at 431; G. WALLACH, .5upra note 5,
7.04[3],
at 7-18.
170. R. ALDERMAN. supra note 5, § 1.81-40, at 431; G. WALLACH, supra note 5, § .0413I, at 718.
171. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978). Section 1-103 provides that supplementary principles of law
apply if they are not displaced by a particular provision. Id. The text of 51-103 is provided supra note
33.
172. See U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1978). Because subsection 3 of § 2-702 does not provide any express
guidance concerning the status of a lien, pre-Code law would seem to be the place to look for an
answer. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978) (authorizing the use of common-law principles unless displaced
by the Code).
173. See Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, Report No. 3, at 3
(1967) (implying that the purpose of the amendment was to prevent the seller's right of reclamation
from becoming illusory).
174. See U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a), (b) (1978) (providing that the Code should be interpreted to
facilitate clarity and uniformity).
175. G. WALLACH, supra note 5, 7.03. In cases other than fraudulent misrepresentations by the
buyer, full and valid title passed with the goods and the seller had no right to reclaim. Id. For a
discussion of the effect of the buyer's misrepresentations on his ability to pass valid title, see supra
notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
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law rule was effective in the instances in which a buyer had gone
into bankruptcy. 17 6 When the credit seller's reclamation right was
codified in section 2-702, however, the reclaiming seller had many
legal difficulties with buyers who later filed bankruptcy. 17 7 The
right of a credit seller to reclaim goods was subject to numerous
trustee avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.178
The status of a reclamation claim in a bankruptcy situation has
changed significantly under the provisions of the 1978 Bankruptcy
Reform Act. 1 79 The most significant provision for a reclaiming
seller is subsection c of section 546.180 If a seller has a right of
reclamation, subsection c precludes a trustee from using four of the
rights and powers that are ordinarily available to him: section
544(a), which gives the trustee the status of a hypothetical lien
creditor;1 8 1 section 545, which allows avoidance of certain statutory
176. See, e.g., Fisher v. Shreve, Crump & Low Co., 7 F.2d 159, 161 (D. Mass. 1925)
(reclamation not a voidable preference); Jones v. H.M. Hobbie Grovery Co. (In re Collins), 246 F.
431, 432 (5th Cir. 1917) (pre-Code case holding that seller prevails over a bankruptcy trustee acting
as lien creditor). In the ordinary, nonfraudulent credit sale, a recovery attempt by the seller was
generally a voidable preference. See, e.g., Plummer v. Myers, 137 F. 660, 662 (E.D. Pa. 1905)
(return of goods to credit seller by bankrupt buyer was an unlawful preference).
177. See, e.g., Robert Weed Plywood Corp. v. Downs (In re Richardson Homes Corp.), 18
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 384, 386 (N.D. Ind. 1975) (S 2-702 reclamation right is subject to
trustee's status as ideal lien creditor); In re Good Deal Supermarkets, Inc., 384 F. Supp 887, 889
(D.N.J. 1974) (5 2-702 constitutes an invalid state created priority).
178. See Mann & Phillips, Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Rejorm Act: An Imperfect Resolution of the
Conflict Between the Reclaiming Seller and the Bankruptcy Trustee, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 239, 248-57 (1980)
4
(hereinafter Mann & Phillips, Section 5 6(c)) (stating that §§ 60, 64(a), 67(c), 70(c), and 70(e)
of the former Bankruptcy Act all arguably allowed the trustee to deteat the reclaiming seller).
179. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified at
II U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982). The Reform Act became law on Nov. 6, 1978, and took effect Oct.
1, 1979. Id. at 2549, 2682. See generally Mann & Phillips, The Reclaiming Seller Under the Bankruptcy
Reform Act: Resolution or Renewal of an Old Conflict? 33 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1980) (assessing the impact of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act upon the conflict between the reclaiming seller and the trustee in
bankruptcy); Wallach, The UnpaidSeller's Right to Reclaim Goods. The Impact of the Uniform Commercial
Code and the Bankruptcy Acts of 1898 and 1978, 34 ARK. L. REv. 252 (1980) (assessing the impact of the
UCC and the bankruptcy laws on the right of reclamation).
180. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (Supp. 11 1984). Subsection c of S 546, in pertinent part, provides:
[Tihe rights and powers ofa trustee under sections 544(a), 545, 547, and 549 of this
title are subject to any statutory or common-law right of a seller of goods that has sold
qoods to the debtor, in the ordinary course of such seller's business, to reclaim such
goods if the debtor has received such goods while insolvent, but (1) such a seller may not reclaim any such goods unless such seller demands in
writing reclamation of such goods before ten days after receipt of such goods by the
debtor; and
(2) the court may deny reclamation to a seller with such a right of reclamation
that has made such a demand only if the court (A) grants the claim of such a seller priority as a claim of a kind specified in
section 503(b) of this title; or
(B) secures such claim by a lien.
Id.
181. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (Supp. 11 1984). Subsection 544(a) modifies § 70(c) of the former
Bankruptcy Act. See H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 370, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& Ao. NEWs 5963, 6326; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 85, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5871. Subsection (a) of S 544 is the so called "strong arm clause" of the
Bankruptcy Code which gives the trustee the rights of: (1) a creditor on a simple contract with a
judicial lien on the property of the debtor as of the date of the petition; (2) a creditor with a writ of
execution against the property of the debtor unsatisfied as of the date of the petition; and (3) a bona
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liens;18 2 section 547, which allows avoidance of certain
preferences; t8 3 and section 549, which allows avoidance of certain
post petition transfers.1 84 Because these four avoidance powers
were among the most troublesome for reclaiming sellers under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898,185 a seller who complies with subsection c
now has significantly more protection in bankruptcy than he did
under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.186
Subsection c sets forth certain requirements that must be met,
however, before the seller is entitled to protection: (1) the goods
must have been sold to the debtor in the ordinary course of the
seller's business; (2) the goods must have been received by the
debtor while he was insolvent; and (3) the seller must demand
reclamation of the goods, in writing, within ten days after their
receipt by the debtor. 187 Additionally, subpart 2 of subsection
fide purchaser of the real property of the debtor as of the date of the petition. Id.(codified at 11
U.S.C. S 544(a)(Supp. 11 1984).
182. See 11 U. S.C. S 545 (1982 & Supp. I 1984). Section 545 is derived from subsections 67(b)
6
and 7(c) of the former Bankruptcy Act. H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 371, reprintedin 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 5963, 6327; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 85, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 5787, 5871. "Liens that first become effective on the
bankruptcy or insolvency of the debtor are voidable by the trustee. Liens that are not perfected or
enforceable on the date of the petition against a bona fide purchaser are voidable." Id. A lien for rent
or of distress for rent is also voidable. Id.
183. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982 & Supp. II 1984). Section 547 modernized the preference
provisions to bring them into conformity with commercial practice and the UCC.-H. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 372, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 5963, 6328; S. REP. No.
989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 87, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5873. Section
547 authorizes the avoidance of a transfer if five conditions are met:
First, the transfer must be to or for the benefit of a creditor. Second, the transfer must
be for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before the transfer was
made. Third, the transfer must have been made when the debtor was insolvent.
Fourth, the transfer must have been made during the 90 days immediately preceding
the commencement of the case [unless the creditor was an insider in which case the
transfer must have been made in the period commencing one year before the filing
and ending 90 days before the petition]. . . . Finally, the transfer must enable the
creditor to or for whose benefit it was made to receive a greater percentage of his
claim than he would under the distributive provisions of the bankruptcy code.
Id.
184. See 11 U.S.C. § 549 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). Section 549 modifies § 70(d) of the former
Bankruptcy Act. H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 375, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEwS 5963, 6331; S. REP. No. 989, 9 5th Cong., 2d Sess. 90, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5787, 5876. Section 549 "permits the trustee to avoid transfers of property that occur
after the commencement of the case." Id. "The transfer must either have been unauthorized, or
authorized under a section that protects only the transferor." Id. The transferee's notice or
knowledge is irrelevant in determining whether he is protected. Id.
185. See, e.g.,
In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820, 822 (3d Cir. 1960) (right of reclamation invalidated in
bankruptcy proceeding under 5 70(c), which gave the trustee lien creditor status); In re Neisner
Bros., 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 157, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (reclamation claim defeated in
bankruptcy as an invalid statutory lien under § 67(c). However, not every court invalidated a seller's
right of reclamation in bankruptcy proceedings under the former Act. See Bassett Furniture Indus.
Inc. v. Wear (In re PFA Farmers Mkt. Ass'n), 583 F.2d 992, 1003 (8th Cir. 1978) (reclaiming seller
prevailed over every power of trustee). Other cases describing the § 2-702 right under the former Act
are listed supra note 177.
186. SeeG. WALLACH, sura note 5, 7.04[41[al, at 7-18 to 7-19.
187. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (Supp. 11 1984). See generally R. HENSON, THE LAW OF SALES,
7.02(b)(ii) (1985) (providing a general discussion of § 546(c)).
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546(c) provides that a seller can be denied reclamation of the goods,
even though all these conditions are met, if the seller's claim is
granted priority status either as an administrative expense or as a
188
secured lien.
Problems with section 546(c), however, may defeat the
section's purpose of ending the confusion and divergent decisions
which existed under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.189 One situation
in which subsection 546(c) will not reduce the likelihood of
litigation is when a trustee challenges the reclamation attempt on
grounds not addressed by the subsection. 190 The trustee may still be
191 548,192
able to use his avoidance powers under sections 544(b),
551193 and 553.194 Because the subsection does not exempt the
reclaiming seller from all the trustee's avoidance powers, there
remain some instances in which the conflict between the reclaiming
seller and the bankruptcy trustee will promote litigation and will be
95
subject to divergent rulings. 1
Another obvious shortcoming of subsection c of section 546 is
that its elements differ substantially from those of UCC section 2702.196 Subsection 546(c) adds the additional requirements that the
sale of goods must have been in the ordinary course of the seller's
188. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(c)(2) (Supp. 11 1984); see also Ohio Farmers Grain & Supply Ass'n v.
Melvin Liquid Fertilizer Co. (In re Melvin Liquid Fertilizer Co.), 37 Bankr. 587, 590 (Bankr. W.D.
Ohio 1984) (reclaiming seller denied possession of the goods but granted administrative expense
priority secured by a lien); McCain Foods, Inc., v. Flagstaff Foodservice Co. New England (In re
Flagstaff Foodservice Corp.), 14 Bankr. 462, 469 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (reclaiming seller given an
administrative priority to the extent of the value of goods in debtor's possession on the date of the
bankruptcy filing).
189. See H. REP. No. 595, 95th Gong., 2d Sess. 372, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs5963, 6328; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 86-87, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWs 5787, 5872-73 (stating that the purpose of § 546(c) "is to recognize, in part, the validity
of section 2-702 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which has generated much litigation, confusion,
aod divergent decisions in different circuits").
190. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
546.04[21 (15th ed. 1986). Section 546(c) only specifically
precludes the trustee from contesting under four enumerated powers, therefore any other powers
available to the trustee could be utilized. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (Supp. 11 1984).
191. See 11 U.S.C. 5 544(b) (1982). Subsection b of § 544, which is derived from § 70(e) of the
former Bankruptcy Act, gives the trustee the rights of actual unsecured creditors, under applicable
law, to void transfers. H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 370, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEWS 5963, 6326.
192. See 11 U.S.C. S 548 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). Section 548, which is derived in large part
from § 67(d) of the former Bankruptcy Act, gives the trustee the power to avoid transfers by the
debtor made to defraud his creditors. H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 375, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6331.
193. See 11 US.C. § 551 (1982). Section 551 "specifies that any avoided transfer is
automatically preserved for the benefit of the estate." H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 376,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 5963, 6332. The operation of § 551 is automatic even
though preservation may not always benefit the estate. Id.
194. See 11 U.S.C. 5 553 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). Section 553, which is derived from § 68 of the
former Bankruptcy Act, states that the right of setoff is generally unaffected by the Bankruptcy Code.
SeeH. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 377, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWs 5963,
6333.
195. See 4 COLLIER, supra note 190, 546.04[2], at 546-15.
196. Compare U.C.C. 5 2-702 (1978) (elements of reclamation by credit seller) with 11 U.S.C. S
546(c) (Supp. It 1984) (elements that must be present for seller to avoid the enumerated trustee
avoidance powers).
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business, 197 and that any demand for reclamation by the seller must
be made in writing.198 Furthermore, the subsection does not allow a
waiver of the ten day demand rule when a seller has received a
written misrepresentation of solvency. 199 These differences between
the two provisions are likely to cause confusion among sellers
seeking to reclaim delivered goods.2 0 0
Subsection c of section 546 also contains many technical
ambiguities for which there are no clear answers. 20 1 The section
requires that a written demand for reclamation be made, but
neither the Bankruptcy Code nor subsection 546(c) establish what
constitutes an adequate
writing to meet this demand
requirement.2 0 2 Moreover, there is no indication of which
definition of "insolvency" will apply to enable the seller to reclaim
the goods. 20 3 Should the broad UCC definition apply 20 4 or the
narrower definition of the Bankruptcy Code? 20 5 An ambiguity also
exists concerning whether subsection 546(c) applies to a cash
seller's reclamation right as well as the credit seller's right of
reclamation set forth in section 2-702.206
197. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (Supp. I1 1984). Section 2-702 of the UCC applies to any sale,
whereas 5 546(c) does not cover sales by a nonmerchant, sales by a merchant that are unrelated to his
business or bulk sales. Marshack, The Return of the Reclaiming Seller: New Decisions Under the Bankruptcy
Code and the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 U.C.C. L.J. 187, 201 (1984).
198. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (Supp. 11 1984); see also In re Kentucky Flush Door Corp., 28 Bankr.
808, 810 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983) (seller denied reclamation in bankruptcy proceeding because no
written demand was made); Roberts v. L.T.S., Inc. (In re L.T.S., Inc.), 32 Bankr. 907, 909 (Bankr.
D. Idaho 1983) (because timely written demand was not made, seller was denied reclamation from
bankrupt buyer). But see United Beef Packers v. Lee (In re A.G.S. Food Sys., Inc.), 14 Bankr. 27, 29
(Bankr. D.S.C. 1980) (beef supplier allowed reclamation even though demand was not in writing).
199. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (Supp. 11 1984). In contrast, UCC 5 2-702 does not require the
reclamation demand be made within ten days of delivery if the seller has received a written
misrepresentation of solvency. U.C.C. 5 2-702(2) (1978).
200. See generally Mann & Phillips, Section 545(c), supra note 178, at 268 (discussing how the
reclaiming seller may be confused by the differences between 5 546(c) and § 2-702(2)).
201. See B. Berger Co. v Contract Interiors, Inc. (In re Contract Interiors, Inc.), 14 Bankr. 670
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981). In Contract Interiors a seller who received written misrepresentation of
solvency was denied reclamation under 5 546(c) because he did not make a written demand within 10
days. Id. at 675. The court also noted that the ten day period for demand may pass simply because a
seller is ignorant of the debtor's bankruptcy proceedings. Id. at 676. Further problems can result
with identification, fungibility, and commingling of goods. See McCain Foods, Inc. v. Flagstaff
Foodservice Co. New England, Inc. (In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp.), 14 Bankr. 462, 469 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1981) (seller of frozen french fries was given a priority claim only to the extent of the
foodstuffs in debtor's possession at the time he made the demand for reclamation).
202. See 11 U.S.C. S 546(c) (Supp. II 1984). Section 2-702 of the UCC does not specifically
require a written demand, but the UCC does contain a definition of "writing." See U.C.C. 5 1201(46) (1978).
203. See In re Furniture Distrib., Inc., 45 Bankr. 38, 42-43 (D. Mass. 1984) (addressing the
problem in determining which section applies and concluding that § 546(c) must be interpreted
according to the Bankruptcy Code definition of "insolvency"); accord In re Storage Technology
Corp., 51 Bankr. 206, 207 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985).
204. See U.C.C. 5 1-201 (23) (1978) (defining insolvency under the UCC). For the text of UCC
1-201(23), see supra note 25.
205. See 11 U.S.C. 5 101(29) (Supp. 1984). For a definition of insolvency under bankruptcy law,
see supra note 25.
206. See R. ALDERMAN, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 1.8050, at 425 (2d ed. 1983) (noting that it could be argued that 5 546(c) deals solely with the reclamation
right of credit sellers).
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Furthermore, subsection c of section 546 provides that the
rights and powers of the trustee are subject to any common-law
reclamation rights of a seller of goods. 20 7 Because of state variations
in the rules for reclamation at common law, and the exclusivity
provision of UCC subsection 2-702(2), some degree of confusion
and uncertainty may result under this aspect of subsection
2 08
546(c).
The biggest and most controversial failure of subsection 546(c)
is that it does not mention what treatment should be accorded a
seller who complies with UCC subsection 2-702(2), but who fails to
comply with every element of subsection 546(c). 20 9 One possible
reading is that subsection 546(c) provides the exclusive, and
conclusive bankruptcy provision governing seller reclamation
rights and failure to comply with it precludes any recovery,
regardless of compliance with section 2-702.210 Under the
alternative interpretation, a seller who satisfies section 2-702, but
not subsection 546(c), will prevail only if the reclamation right can
survive all of the trustee's avoidance powers.

211

This reading of

subsection 546(c) as a "non-exclusive safe harbor ' ' 2 12 has the
potential of resurrecting the confusion and divergent decisions
213
which existed under the former Bankruptcy Act.
207. See 11 U.S.C. S 546(c) (Supp. II 1984). Presumably the credit seller could base a
reclamation claim in bankruptcy on both § 2-702 and common-law fraud. Mann & Phillips, Section
546(c), supra note 178, at 260. If so, the exclusivity language of § 2-702(2) would be regarded as
negated in bankruptcy on federal supremacy grounds. Id. at 260-61. However, the recognition of §
2-702 in S 546(c) makes it difficult to imagine situations in which the recourse to common-law rules
will be necessary. Id. at 261 n. 107.
208. MANN & PHILLIPS, Section 546(c), supra note 178, at 262.
209. Compare Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Walters (In re Walters), 17 Bankr. 644, 648 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1982) ("[tlhe right to reclaim goods, however, may be exercised in circumstances other
than those governed by § 546(c)") and United Beef Packers v. Lee (In re A.G.S. Food Sys., Inc.), 14
Bankr. 27, 28-29 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1980) (sellers who fail to follow § 546(c) can still prevail if they can
defeat all the trustee's avoiding powers) with Ateco Equip., Inc. v. Columbia Gas (In re Ateco
Equip., Inc.), 18 Bankr. 917, 919-20 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982) (reclamation is permitted in
bankruptcy only if § 546(c) is followed) and B. Berger Co. v. Contract Interiors, Inc. (In re Contract
Interiors, Inc.), 14 Bankr. 670, 675 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981) (S 546(c) is the exclusive reclamation
procedure in bankruptcy). See also Mann & Phillips, Section 546(c), supra note 178, at 267 (contending
that a credit seller should be allowed to challenge the trustee when he complies with UCC § 2-702
even though he does not comply with § 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code).
210. See, e.g., B. Berger Co. v. Contract Interiors, Inc. (In re Contract Interiors, Inc.), 14
Bankr. 670, 675 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981) (§ 546(c) is the exclusive reclamation procedure in
bankruptcy).
211. Mann & Phillips, supra note 179, at 51-54 (contending that a seller who complies with UCC
2-702 should be allowed to contest the trustee's avoidance powers even though he does not comply
with the provisions of § 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Act). For further authority endorsing this view, see
supra note 209, and infra note 212.
212. The term "non-exclusive safe harbor," referring to the view that § 546(c), when complied
with, should protect the seller but should not be considered as the sole source of a seller's right to
reclaim when the buyer goes bankrupt, originated in an article by.Mann and Phillips. See Mann &
Phillips, Section 545(c), supra note 178; seealso United Beef Packers v. Lee (In re A.G.S.Food Sys.,
Inc.), 14 Bankr. 27, 28-29 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1980) (adopting the position that § 546(c) is not the
exclusive reclamation procedure in bankruptcy).
213. See G. WALLACH, supra note 5, 1 7.04141[a], at 7-20. Wallach maintains that compliance
with UCC § 2-702 will allow reclamation in the bankruptcy context even though § 546(c) of the
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A final area in which the potential for confusion and litigation
is substantially increased with the enactment of subsection 546(c),
is under subpart 2, which authorizes the denial of a valid
reclamation right if the seller is provided with an administrative
expense priority or a secured lien.2 14 One of the issues implicit in
this situation is whether a reclaiming seller who has been denied
possession of the goods should be entitled to interest on the claim,
since the claim is not immediately collectible.2 15 Furthermore, there
is some question whether the seller should be entitled to "adequate
protection" under the Bankruptcy Code because their interest in
2 16
the property may be depreciating.
Subpart 2 is also subject to different judicial interpretations
concerning whether a reclaiming seller can be given an
administrative expense priority or a lien if the seller cannot reclaim
the goods because of a third party's superior claim.2 17 One view
allows a lien or administrative priority only if the seller is otherwise
entitled to possession of the goods. 218 The alternative view grants
the seller a priority claim or lien as long as the requirements of
546(c) have been satisfied. 2 19 Under the second view, a seller has a
valid claim regardless of whether a third party has a superior
claim.220
In summary, subsection c of section 546 provides significant
protection for the reclamation right when asserted against a
bankrupt buyer. 22t However, subsection 546(c) may not always
apply, and its enactment gives rise to further ambiguities in the
conflict between the reclaiming seller and the bankruptcy
trustee.2 22 Because of the supremacy of federal laws, any
Bankruptcy Code is not complied with, and that in such cases the court will have to resort to the law
existing prior to the adoption of the Bankruptcy Code. Id.
214. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(c)(2) (Supp. 11 1984).
215. See Marshack, supra note 197, at 219. The author states that "a court, given the proper
circumstances, may provide a reclaiming seller . . . interest [on his claim] only so subsequent
creditors of the debtor will not have priority over goods sought to be reclaimed." Id. at 219-20.
216. See generally id. at 216-19; 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (Supp. 11 1984) (court may condition use of
property to ensure that another party's interest is adequately protected). Marshack argues that the
reclaiming seller is entitled to adequate protection when an administrative expense or lien is given
merely to enable the bankrupt to use the property to reorganize. Marshack, supra note 197, at 218. In
other situations, Marshack argues that the seller is not entitled to adequate protection. See id. at 21619.
217. See Marshack, supra note 197, at 204-05 (discussing whether the reclaiming seller may be
given a lien or administrative expense if a third party has an interest in the goods).
218. See McCain Foods, Inc. v. Flagstaff Foodservice Co. New England, Inc. (In re Flagstaff
Foodservice Corp.), 14 Bankr. 462, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (seller's administrative claim or lien was
limited to the value of goods remaining in debtor's possession when bankruptcy was filed).
219. See Western Farmers Ass'n v. Geigy (In re Western Farmers Ass'n), 6 Bankr. 432, 435
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1980) (seller granted a lien on all debtor's assets subordinate to secured party's
interest).
220. See Marshack, supra note 197, at 204-05.
221. See supra notes 179-86 and accompanying text.
222. See generally Henson, The Uniform Commercial Code and the New Bankruptcy Act: Some Problem
Areas, 35 Bus. LAW. 83 (1979). In noting some of the problems posed by S 546(c) Henson states that
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amendment to section 2-702 will have a limited effect on the
reclamation- in-bankruptcy issue. 223 Commentators have proposed
a specific change within section 546(c) to end the controversy. 2 24 As
it now stands, however, the reclamation-in-bankruptcy claim is
unnecessarily complex and riddled with uncertainties.
IV. CONCLUSION
Section 2-702 fails to provide a clear delineation of the status of
the reclamation right when a third party intervenes. 225 This
ambiguity has spawned an entangled body of case law and
numerous contradictory judicial approaches. To prevent the
inequity which results when a secured party prevails although he
has neither relied upon the buyer's ownership of the goods nor
advanced funds after their delivery, section 2-702 can either be
revised or interpreted more restrictively.2 2 6 The confusion and
complexity of the lien-reclamation conflict can probably be cured
22 7
by adopting the Editorial Board's recommended amendment.
The attempted application of section 2-702 in the bankruptcy
context has been so incoherent that Congress itself has felt
compelled to attempt a remedy. 228 The Bankruptcy Code's new
provision, however, also has shortcomings and ambiguities that
2 29
need to be addressed.
Louis B.

KUCHERA

"[tlhrough all of the difficulties at least one thing appears to be certain: the drafting is such that
lawyers will be making a living from its ambiguities for a long time to come." Id. at 99. Another
commentator has concluded that "[i]t is readily apparent that section 546(c) has not achieved its
intended goal of eliminating disruptive litigation. There continues to exist fertile ground from which
such litigation can sprout .... " Comment, Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act: A Seller's
"Exclusive" ReclamationRemedy? 3 J. L. & CoM. 389, 400 (1983) (footnote omitted).
223. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.4. The United States Constitution gives Congress the power
"{t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." Id.;
see also Moskowitz v. Prentice (In re Wisconsin Builders Supply Co.), 239 F.2d 649, 654 (7th Cir.
1956) (provisions of a state's Insolvency Act suspended by paramount federal Bankruptcy Act).
224. Mann & Phillips, Section 545(c), supra note 178, at 268-73. The amendment suggested by
the authors is generally intended to clear ambiguities as to whether § 546(c) applies to cash sales, and
whether it is the exclusive right of a seller to reclaim from a bankrupt buyer. See id.
at 273.
225. See U.C.C. S 2-702 (1978).
226. See supra notes 87-104 and accompanying text.
227. Seesupra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 189-220 and accompanying text.

